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PREFACE 
Imagery offers a stimulating and important area of investigation 
to the behavioral scientist. New findings from related areas of re-
search, new questions and new techniques for the objective study of 
imagery have recently combined to give new validity to its investiga-
tion. This thesis combines literature from the areas of imagery, 
blinking, visual masking and hemispheric specialization in order to 
deal with the issue of the nature of imagery. Specifically, the the-
sis deals with the question of whether imagery can be visually masked 
like perception. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Visual imagery is perhaps best known to most people through 
their dreams and daydreams. As research into the area has grown, how-
ever, imagery has been shown to have important functions in many other 
aspects of man's life. Cooper and Shepard (1972), for instance, have 
related their work with mental rotation of images to such everyday ac-
tivities as 
assembling the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle; rearranging fur-
niture in a room; finding and fitting together the variously-
shaped parts of a complicated mechanical device; and (at a 
much more abstract, theoretical level) working out a creative 
solution to a problem in geometry, electrical engineering, 
stereochemistry, or theoretical physics (Cooper and Shepard, 
1972, p. 98). 
Other spatial transformations which occur mentally may play a role in 
such areas as "choreography, gymnastics, modeling in clay, or solving 
problems in topography" (Cooper and Shepard, 1972, p. 98). The in-
surance investigator "reconstructing" an accident, the seamstress 
matching fabric to pattern, and the professional tennis player men-
tally practicing her swing are all instances of the everyday uses of 
imagery. Almost anyone can add to the list from his or her own ex-
periences. 
Downs and Stea (1973) deal with the image in terms of man's cog-
nitive mapping of his environment. Their work combines contributions 
from such diverse areas as neurophysiology, cognitive psychology, 
1 
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animal learning, urban sociology and psychophysics in an attempt to 
gain insight into how imagery aids man in knowing where things are in 
' his environment and how he can get from one place·to another. 
Another of the diverse fields in which research in imagery is now 
taking place is that of the psychology of motivation. Klinger (1969), 
for instance, reports on the connections between play and fantasy, 
which he finds resemble each other in both content and structure at 
important points in development. Imagery is discussed because, as 
Klinger reports, fantasy can be defined as "imagining a complex object 
or event in concrete symbols as images, whether or not the object or 
event exists; or the symbols or images themselves: e.g., a daydream" 
(English and En~lish, 1958, p. 203). The use of images in fantasy is 
unique because the images are not evaluated by the individual in terms 
of gaining any immediate goal other than the imagery (fantasy) itself. 
There has been increased interest also in imagery in clinical 
settings (Jacobs, 1971; Jacobs and Wolpin, 1971) using behavior modi-
fication techniques and systematic desensitization procedures pat-
terned after Wolpe (Hall and Lindzey, 1970; Vetter and Smith, 1971). 
In its original application Wolpe treated human neuroses by first 
training the patient to relax his major muscle groups at will. Next. 
the patient and the therapist ranked a series of situations according 
to the degree of anxiety they aroused in the patient. Finally, the 
patient maintained relaxation while imagining, in turn, the series of 
situations. Extinction of anxiety reactions occurs at each level and 
generalizes to the next level until the most anxiety producing situa~ 
tion is no longer a problem to the patient. 
3 
Bugelski (1971) addresses himself to the relatively new area of 
animal language acquisition when he reports on the chimpanzee Washoe's 
acquisition of sign language. When Washoe hears the bark of a dog, 
she can make the sign for a dog, even though she cannot see the other 
animal. In making such a communication about an absent object, the 
chimpanzee is nevertheless indicating that she does have somethirig to 
talk about. That something, according to Bugelski, is an image. Such 
interpretations of Washoe's behavior have obvious implications for in-
terpretations of human language acquisition. 
A more mundane area of research on imagery is that involved in 
memorization. Indeed, the use of imagery to aid memory has long been 
a well known technique. Cicero told the story of how Simonides in-
1 
vented the art of memory by devising the method of loci (Norman, 
1969). As summarized by Bower (1970), the method consists of memo-
rizing a list of mental pictures of locations arranged in their famil-
iar order, making up images which are in some way symbolic of the 
information to be remembered, and associating the images with the 
imaginary locations. Then all that one must 'do to remember the in-
formation is to trace his footsteps through the imaginary locations. 
As he proceeds from one location to another, he will find the symbols 
of the items he is to recall. Another memory technique, the numeric 
pegword system, makes similar use of imagery. The memory pegwords are 
images of unrelated concrete objects associated in a one-to-one manner 
with integers (usually by rhyme, e.g., one-bun, two-shoe). Then con-
nections are made between the imagery pegs and the images symbolic of 
/information to be remembered. Recall of a specific integer brings to 
mind the associated pegword and the information to be remembered 
(Bower, 1970). 
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As is clearly evident in the above, imagery plays an important 
role in many areas of man's life. The research and theoretical con-
siderations presented thus far, however, have dealt with only one as-
pect of imagery, the functional aspect. Of more importance to the 
present study is the nature (i.e., the internal structure) of imagery. 
CHAPTER II 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
As imagery is such an integral part of man's life, it is not sur-
prising that it has long been a topic of investigation. The ancient 
Greeks wrestled with the phenomenon philosophically. Plato's impres-
sions on a "wax tablet" were equivalent to the image; perceptions and 
thoughts impressed in such a way upon the mind were remembered for as 
long as the image lasted (Paivio, 1971). Images were also the basis 
of memory for Aristotle (Watson, 1971). Indeed, Aristotle also in-
sisted that thinking takes place in images and can never occur without 
them (a belief which was held until the investigations of the Wurzberg 
school nearly two thousand two hundred and fifty years later). 
Imagery came under scientific study with the pioneering efforts 
of Sir Francis Galton in the late nineteenth century. While his ini-
tial work generated much interest and numerous empirical studies, sub-
jective concepts (such as imagery) and the introspective method used 
to study them soon fell into disrepute. Contributing heavily to this 
change in Zeitgeist was Watson's view that imagery was devoid of any 
functional significance (Pai.via, 1971). 
More recently, however, there has been a renewed interest in the 
study of imagery. The current revival of work in investigating image-
ry has led to several different theories concerning the nature of im-
agery. The theories appear to lie along a continuum, with the 
5 
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extremes depicting imagery as being either very much like perception (i.e., 
pictorial) or very different from perception. Neisser (196 7, 1968, 1970}, 
for instance, considers imagery and perception both to be the result of 
the same underlying process of "analysis-by-synthesis." As a result he 
argues that visual imagery is very much like perception. Pylyshyn (1973), 
on the other hand, suggests that imagery is represented in the brain by 
fundamental propositions which are not sensory or pictorial in any way. 
Imagery, according to this theory, is not at all like perception. 
The renewed interest in imagery has also generated new techniques 
for studying imagery which do not involve introspective reports from 
subjects about the nature of their images. Shepard and Feng (1972), 
for example, measured response times for subjects to make decisions about 
patterns of squares which, when folded, would result in a cube. The 
subjects had to decide whether two arrows, each positioned on one side 
of two different squares, would meet when the squares were folded to 
produce the cube. Cooper and Shepard (1972) have measured reaction 
times of subjects required to decide whether a letter is presented cor-
rectly or as its mirror image when it is presented at a tilted angle. 
Weber and Castleman (1970) also used letters of the alphabet in their 
development of an objective technique to study imagery. They had sub-
jects classify imagined, lowercase, typed letters of the alphabet into 
two groups based on vertical height. One group consisted of the small 
letters (i.e., a, c, e, i, m, n, o, r, s, u, v, w, x, z) and the other 
consisted of the large letters (i.e., b, d, f, g, h, j, k, 1, p, q, t, 
and y). Weber and Kelly's (1972) subjects also classified letters into 
two groups. In this instance, however, the subjects were working with 
imagined, uppercase, typed letters, and the two groups consisted of 
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those letters with vertical straight lines (i.e., B, D, E, F, H, I, J, 
K, L, M, N, P, R, T, U, and Y) and those without vertical straight 
lines (i.e., A, C, G, O, Q, S, V, W, X, and Z). 
These new techniques for studying imagery objectively and the 
empirical questions suggested by basic differences between theories 
about the nature of imagery (i.e., that images are or are not like 
perceptions) represent the rationale behind the present study. The 
present study will deal with the question of whether imagery is like 
perception (i.e., is at least to some extent pictorial). If, indeed, 
imagery is in some way like perception, it may be expected to be af-
fected by some of the same variables which affect perception. 
One potentially important aspect of the visual system (i.e., of 
visual perception and perhaps of visual imagery) is the ey.eblink (Pon-
der and Kennedy, 1927; Hall, 1945). Holland and Tarlow (1972) have 
noted that one characteristic of mental activity (of which imagery is 
one example) is a reduction of blinking activity. They hypothesized 
that blinking disrupts certain cognitive processes and that inhibition 
of blinking during such processing serves to protect the mental acti-
vity from interference. 
The rapid closing and opening of the eye as in the blink strongly 
suggests the phenomenon of visual masking using flashes of light or 
"visual noise". as the source of this interference with the visual 
image. Visual masking is a broad term which "covers the class of 
situations in which some measure of the effectiveness of a visual sti-
mulus (the test stimulus, TS) is reduced by the presentation of 
another (the masking stimulus, MS) in close tempo!al contiguity to it" 
(Kahneman, 1968, p. 404). Thus, the eyeblink seems analogous to the 
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masking paradigm in the sense that it seems to disrupt image forma-
tion. 
The reader may experience this disruption for himself in the fol-
lowing demonstration. With eyes open, imagine a word (e.g., "toy'') 
printed in black type appearing on a piece of blank white paper. Af-
ter having the image firmly in mind, blink one time. For most peop~e 
the image will be gone and it will take some time to regenerate it. 
It is as if both images (the original image and the regenerated image) 
have in some way been masked by the "field of visual noise" produced 
by the eyeblink. An image formed with the eyes closed can be disrup-
ted similariy by rapid opening and closing· of the eyes one time. Again 
the reader may demonstrate the effect to himself by imagining a word 
with eyes closed. After having the image firmly in mind, open and 
close both eyes rapidly one time. Some people, at least, will report 
that the image is gone, and it will take some time before a second im-
age can be generated (i.e., the images will have been masked by the 
flash of light). 
Recently a new dimension has been added to the study of imagery 
as research in hemispheri.c specialization (also called cerebral later-
alization, hemispheric asymmetry, or, less specifically, the "split-
brain" phenomenon) has come into prominence. Some of the most 
exciting work in psychology is taking place within this area of re-
search. Indeed research with the split-brain holds promise of new 
insights into even some of the oldest problems in psychology. Hebb 
(1974), for instance, has stated, 
Today, no one, psychologist, philosopher, neurologist, 
or humanist, is entitled to an. opinion on ~he mind-body 
question if he is unfamiliar with the split-brain pro-
cedure and its results in human patients (Hebb, 1974, 
p. 76). 
The research techniques used in studies of hemispheric speciali-
zation in normal subjects were developed as a result of an early in-
vestigation into the function of the great nerve fiber bundles (i.e., 
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commissures) which connect the left and right hemispheres of the brain 
(Sperry, 1967). It was found that the commissures, of which the larg-
est and most discrete is the corpus callosum, transmit information be-
tween the two hemispheres. The many resulting hemispheric specializa-
tion studies have shown that the right and left hemispheres of the 
higher primate brain are specialized for processing different kinds of 
information (Sperry, 1967, 1968; Gazzaniga, 1970; Gibson, Filbey and 
Gazzaniga, 1970; Rizzolatti, Umilta and Berlucchi, 1971; Klatzky, 
1970; Kimura, 1966, for example). In the human brain (for most indi-
viduals) the left hemisphere is specialized for processing verbal in-
formation and the right hemisphere is specialized for processing 
spatial information (Gazzaniga, 1970). Paivio and Ernest (1971) sug-
gest that "the theoretical and operational definition of imagery in 
terms of figural ability suggests a relationship only between imagery 
ability and the recognition of nonverbal stimuli" (p. 429) (as opposed 
to there being a relationship between imagery ability and the recogni-
tion of any type of material). Thus, for these investigators, imagery 
ability is equated with spatial or figural-transformational ability. 
Specialization for imagery processing should be located in the right 
hemisphere, according to this reasoning. 
The earliest studies in hemispheric specialization in human sub-
jects were done with patients who had had their corpus callosum cut 
surgically (usually in an attempt to control epileptic seizures). 
Such subjects are rare, however, and necessarily represent a unique 
subgroup of the general population. More recent work has been aimed 
at investigating hemispheric specialization in normal ;subjects. 
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In normal subjects, of course, the corpus callosum is still in-
tact, and the problem becomes one of developing a methodology to study 
hemispheric specialization even though information is being trans-
ferred across the commissures. Filbey and Gazzaniga (1969) were the 
first researchers to suggest "splitting the normal brain with reaction 
time" (p. 335). 
With normal subjects the split-brain technique developed by these 
researchers involves presentation of material to either side of a mid-
line in the visual field, i.e., to the left visual field (LVF) or 
right visual field (RVF). Directing stimulus material to either 
specific hemisphere is possible because of the neural organization of 
the optic nerves. According to Gazzaniga's (1970) findings, "the 
visual midline represents nothing but the abutment of the two visual 
fields. The visual fields were found to stop exactly on the midline, 
with no overlap ... evident" (p. 92). (See also Sperry, 1968.) 
Thus, when a subject is focusing with both eyes on a midpoint in his 
total visual field, stimuli p·resented from the LVF are projected to 
the right hemiretinas of his eyes. Conversely, presentation from the 
RVF is to the left hemiretina of each eye. The optic nerve fibers 
from each hemiretina project to the corresponding lateral geniculate 
body of the thalamus, i.e., nerve fibers from the left half of the 
retinas project to the left lateral geniculate body and nerve fibers 
from the right half of the retinas project to the right lateral 
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geniculate body. The crossing of the nerve fibers (see Figure 1) oc-
curs at the optic chiasm, the point where the two optic nerves meet 
(Thompson, 1967). From the lateral geniculate bodies information 
falling on the right hemiretinas goes directly to the right hemisphere 
and information falling on the left hemiretinas goes directly to the 
left hemisphere. 
If the material to be processed is verbal in nature and is pre-
sented via the LVF, it is projected to the right hemisphere and must 
cross to the left hemisphere before it can be processed. This pro-
cessing takes fractions of a second longer than if the material had 
been presented via the RVF and had gone directly to the left hemi-
sphere. The opposite is true for information to be processed spatial-
ly. Thus, by comparing reaction times for different (verbal and spa-
tial) tasks, one can split the brain with reaction time. 
In terms of the present study, the split-brain paradigm (as used 
with normal subjects) is valuable in enabling a more precise investi-
gation of imagery processing.· Hemispheric asymmetry for imagery per-
haps suggests, for instance, that in some cases perception and imagery 
may indeed be processed "differently" and, thus, that imagery may be 
quite different from perception. McKeever and Gill (1972) have used 
the paradigm in a preliminary study of masking effects on perception. 
Using alphabetic letters as stimuli, they predicted that masking ef-
fects would be greater for the LVF than for the RVF because the abili-
ty to retain temporal patterning of letter input varies "inversely 
with the transmission pathway length and complexity" (McKeever and 
Gill, 1972, p. 112). Their results showed this for right-handed, but 
not for left-handed subjects. Specifically, "initial right visual 
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Figure 1. The Relationship of Visual Presentation Fields, 
Left and Right Hemiretinas and the Informational 
Pathways to Left and Right Hemispheres 
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field letters escaped heavy masking by subsequent stimuli in right 
handers while initial left visual field letters escaped heavy masking 
in left handers" (McKeever and Gill, 1972, p. 115). Since backward · 
masking studies show that there is interference in the re~ognition of 
an initial stimulus if it is closely followed by a second stimulus de-
livered to the same retinal area (because the initial stimulus is not 
completely processed prior to interference by the second stimulus), 
the ability to preserve temporal patterning of letter input might help 
to reduce masking effects. 
Seamon and Gazzaniga (1973) have investigated cerebral laterality 
effects using coding strategies (relational imagery and verbal rehear-
sal) for a short-term recognition memory task. They found that imag-
ery coding appeared to be specialized in the right hemisphere while 
verbal rehearsal was specialized in the left hemisphere. In conclu-
sion, they argue for ''the inclusion of imagery, or generated visual 
information, as part of the visual processing system" (~eamon and Gaz-
zaniga, 1973, p. 255). 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the nature of 
imagery. If imagery is like perception, (i.e., pictorial) it should 
be affected by some of the same variables which affect visual percep-· 
tion. As suggested by the eyeblink, one such variable may be masking 
effects. Specifically, then, the study incorporated an objective 
technique for studying imagery with the "split-brain" procedures used 
with normal subjects to define imagery precisely. Ta~histoscopic pre-
sentation of stimul~ with dark and light pre- and post-exposure fields 
was used to compare the effects of masking on perception and imagery 
when the subject was engaged in a spatial task. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Imagery 
In 1880 when Galton published the results of his questionnaire 
studies in imagery, he made no effort to present a theory of either 
the function or the nature of imagery. Rather, he meant only "to de-
fine the different degrees of vividness with which different persons 
have the faculty of recalling familiar scenes under the form of mental 
pictures, and the peculiarities of the mental visions of different 
persons" (Galton, 1880, p. 21). His results, which revealed a wide 
variety of individual differences in ability to produce "mental im-
ages," were a fascinating beginning to the study of imagery, but they 
did little to increase man's knowledge concerning the structure of the 
image itself. 
Bower (1970) admits that we have not come much further since Gal-
ton in agreeing on what an image is. According to him, however, sci-
entists need not get involved in "philosophical problems" when dealing 
with imagery. For Bower, all that is neede~ for research in imagery 
to be valid is the agreement that something is subjectively present to 
the subject which enables him to experience some of the structural in-
formation which was available to him perceptually in an earlier per-
ception of the object. While this viewpoint may apply to the memory 
14 
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image, it is a rather limited position considering the wide range of 
images used by man. 
Other investigators have expanded their work to theorizing about 
the nature of that "something" (Bower, 1970) which is present to the 
' subject. Four such theorists include Neisser (1967, 1968, 1970), Hebb 
(1966), Shepard (Shepard and Chipman, 1970; Shepard and Feng, 1972; 
Cooper and Shepard, 1972) and Pylyshyn (1973). Their theories con-
cerning the nature of imagery appear to lie along a continuum, ranging 
from the position that images and percepts have highly similar repre-
sentation within the mind to the position that images and percepts 
have highly dissimilar representations within the mind. 
The first of these theorists to be discussed is Neisser (1967, 
1968, 1970), for whom imagery is a manifestation of the "analysis-by-
synthesis" of perceptions. As he presents the idea, the process of 
visual cognition consists of two stages. The first is a pre-attentive 
stage which is wholistic in nature and results in iconic storage of 
the visual object for a period just long enough to make it available 
for further analysis. Detailed aspects of the object are not auto-
matically present as a result of processing in this stage, but must 
be selected for the second stage (that of focal attention) and then 
must be subjected to further processing. If focal attention is drawn 
to the object (or some aspect of the object), there is a synthesis of 
a percept of the object. This synthesis is based upon not only the 
stimulus information, but also past experience, expectations and pref-
erences. Thus, both the object being "observed" and the nature of the 
analysis performed upon its stimulus information may vary from time to 
time and from person to person. The important point made by Neisser 
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(1967) is that once an object has been thus constructed perceptually, 
it can be reconstructed in the form of a visual memory image. Neisser 
also accounts for other than memory images when he suggests that "Per-
haps we experience familiarity to the extent that the present act of 
visual synthesis is identical to an earlier one" (Neisser, 1967, p. 
98). 
Hebb (1966) defines imagery as "the occurrence of perceptual 
processes in the absence of the stimulation which.normally gives rise 
to the perception" (Hebb, 1966, p. 41) when the subject realizes that 
he is not actually perceiving an external event. Based on the fact 
that persons cannot read backwards words represented as images in 
their minds, he feels that the memory image is not like "having a pic-
ture in your mind" (Hebb, 1966, p. 43). Instead, he explains the 
memory image as being analogous to sensation in a phantom limb or to 
the presence of negative after-images to the extent that they are re-
occurrences of some of the same processes which occurred during prior 
perception of the object. The ability of a person to read an imagined 
word faster in left to right order is taken as evidence that some of 
the same processes are being reinstated as when one originally read 
the printed external stimulus word. The image is a series of events 
which occur in particular order (as perception did); it is not a pic-
ture that can be scanned in any order. 
In attempting to an~lyze the image in physiological terms, Hebb 
proposes that the image is the result of a "short-circuiting of the 
sensory-perceptual pathway" (Hebb, 1968, p. 467). Hence, the images 
are either produced by excitation of the central processes through 
spontaneous firing of afferent neurons or through associations with 
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other excited cell assemblies. Citing the work of Hubel and Wiesel 
(1968), Hebb describes how the different levels of cell assemblies can 
account for the different degrees of vividness in imagery. 
A "simple cell" in the cortex responds to a specific reti-
nal stimulation, its receptive field permitting little 
variation; but "complex cells" respond to stimulation in 
any part of their larger receptive fields • . . . A sub-
assembly made up of simple cells, or controlled by them, 
will thus be representative of a very specific sensory 
event, but one made up of complex cells will incorporate 
in itself some degree of generalization or abstraction. 
Assembly activities accordingly may be more or less spe-
cific as perceptual or imaginal events (Hebb, 1968, p. 
471). 
This explanation of the differences in vividness of imagery puts Hebb 
in agreement with Neisser's (1967) explanation of unusual or unfamil-
iar imagery. Neisser suggests that such imagery may be the result of 
a serial reconstruction of the perceptual process which has been ter-
minated before it was complete. Unlike Galton (1880), who interpreted 
his results to mean that men possessed different abilities to imagine, 
Hebb feels that at least some imagery is simply so "fleeting and un-
obtrusive" (Hebb, 1968, p. 4 76) that people fail to report it. Thus, 
for Hebb, the difference between people who have much imagery and 
those who have little is "not a difference of the mechanism of think-
ing, but a difference in the retrievability of the image11 (Hebb, 1968, 
p. 476). 
Shepard has noted that there is a temptation to suppose that 
there is a structural isomorphism between the external object and its 
internal representation. Such a "first-order" isomorphism could even 
lead to the insistance that Hebb's cell assemblies be spatially ar-
ranged in the form of a square when the subject was perceiving a 
square. Such a first-order concept of isomorphism has been, of 
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course, discredited if for no other reason than the fact that "we 
learn the appropriate use of such words as 'square' from a verbal com-
munity that has access only to the public object and not to any such 
private image" (Shepard and Chipman, 1970, p. 1). Shepard proposes 
instead a "second-order" isomorphism between "(a) the relations among 
alternative external objects, and (b) the relations among their car-
responding internal representations" (Shepard and Chipman, 1970, p. 
2). Shepard interprets his results from several experiments (in which 
S's mentally folded connected squares into the shape of a cube) to 
mean that the §_'s mental processing was analagous to the physical pro-
cess. He interprets this to mean that 
whatever neurophysiological events are taking place while 
one is merely imagining the external process in question--
these events have much in common with the internal events 
that occur when one is actually perceiving the external 
process itself (Shepard and Feng, 1972, p. 242). 
Thus, when his subjects did the mental folding task, they had to de-
cide whether two arrows placed on the sides of two of six squares 
would touch when the six squares were folded to form a cube. The S's 
response times to make the decision increased linearly with the sum of 
the number of squares which would have been involved (to make the ar-
rows touch), if the folding had actually been done. 
As a corollary to his basic principle of second-order .isomor-
phism, Shepard suggests that "while one is in the course of imagining 
the external process--one passes through an ordered set of internal 
states of special relation to or readiness for the successive states 
of the external process" (Shepard and Feng, 1972, p. 242). To test 
this corollary, Cooper and Shepard (1972) did two chronometric studies 
of the rotation of mental images. Using asymmetrical alphanumeric 
characters as their stimuli, they measured response times to make a 
decision of whether the stimulus was in its normal or mirror-image 
position when it was presented in different tilted angles from the 
normal upright position. Their empirical findings as interpreted 
theoretically show, in part, 
Mental rotation is an analog process with a serial 
structure bearing a one-to-one relationship to the cor-
responding physical rotation. The time required (men-
tally) to rotate from an orientation A to an orientation 
C is just the sum of the times required to rotate from A 
to some intermediate orientation B, and to rotate from B 
to C ..• Moreover, in mentally rotating an object be-
tween any two widely separated orientations, A and C, 
the internal process passes through the mental image 
corresponding to that same object in some intermediate 
orientation, .•• Consequently, the orientation at 
which the subject is most prepared for the appearance of 
that object at each moment is actually rotating with re-
spect to the external world (Cooper and Shepard, 1972, 
pp. 95-96). 
Cooper and Shepard (1972) conclude that their work has shown several 
things about the nature of the image. They state that the internal 
representation of an external object (i.e., the image) 
has an internal structure that is itself to some extent 
analogically related to the structure of its corresponding 
external object. For, during the process of rotation, the 
parts and the relationships among the parts must be trans-
formed in very constrained ways in order to enable the 
kind of rapid, template-like match against an ensuing visual 
stimulus that we have demonstrated here. 
Clearly, the internal representation cannot adequately 
be regarded either as an undifferentiated neural event (such 
as the activation of a particular neuron or population of 
mutually interchangeable neurons) at the neurophysiological 
level, or simply as an unanalyzable symbol at the informa-
tion-processing level (Cooper and Shepard, 1972, p. 99). 
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Pylyshyn (1973) attacks the use of "mental image" as a theoreti-
cal construct used to describe one form of memory representation. 
Rather, he suggests that unconscious underlying mental structures 
(which are conceptual and propositional and not in any way sensory or 
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pictorial) are what give characterization to stored knowledge (Pyly-
shyn, 1973). Pylyshyn sees knowledge as propositional. Such know-
ledge is derived from language (sentences) and pictures (perceptions). 
Yet, 
[j]ust as cognition requires propositions which stand in 
a type-token relation to sentences, so also does it re-
quire something which stands in a type-token relation to 
pictures or sensory patterns. This something is best 
characterized as a descriptive symbol structure contain-
ing perceptual concepts and relations, but having the, 
abstract qualities of propositions rather than the par-
ticular qualities of pictorial images. Furthermore, to 
refer to a representation arising from sensory stimula-
tion as being propositional, as we have been advocating, 
is to imply (a) that it does not correspond to a raw 
sensory pattern, but rather, is already highly abstrac-
ted and interpreted, (b) that it is not different in 
principle from the kind of knowledge asserted by a sen-
tence, or potentially assertahle by some sentence, (c) 
that it depends on the classification of sensory events 
into a finite set of concepts and relations, so that 
what we know about some event or object is formally 
equivalent to (i.e., can be reduced to) a finite (and, 
in fact, relatively small) number of logically indepen-
dent descriptive propositions (Pylyshyn, 1973, p. 7). 
Hence, Pylyshyn differs from Neisser's and Hebb's view that images are 
comparable to perceptions. He argues, instead, that for images 
the functional mental representation is not to be iden-
tified with the input to a perceptual stage but rather 
with the output of such a stage, inasmuch as it must al-
ready contain, in some explicit manner, those cognitive 
products which perception normally provides. If we 
could think of functional (rather than phenomenal) 
"images" in this sense, we would have removed the dis-
turbing duality of "image" and "mind's eye," while, at 
the same time, we would have answered some of the puz-
zling classical questions referred to earlier: An image 
qua representation in our sense can certainly be selec-
tive, generic, abstract, and even unconscious inasmuch 
as the cognitive products of perception can be all of 
these (Pylyshyn, 1973, p. 12). 
The four theories discussed above, then, seem to lie on a con-
tinuum. Neisser (1967, 1968, 1970) describes images to be very much 
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like pictorial perceptions. In fact, he sees them as being the end 
result of the same basic process: percepts are synthesized from sen-
sory stimulation and images are reconstructions of the original syn-
thesis. Hebb (1966, 1968) equates the image to a series of neurologi-
cal events which occur in the same serial order as did the neurological 
events which produced the perception. Shepard's work (Shepard and 
Chipman, 1970; Shepard and Feng, 1972; Cooper and Shepard, 1972) is 
meant to show that the image does not stand in a one-to-one relation-
ship with the percept, but rather, that the relationships between the 
parts of the image and the relationships between the parts of the per-
cept are in this type of one-to-one relationship. Pylyshyn (1973), on 
the other hand, extends this basic concept to propose that the image is 
not like the percept, but is a product of the propositional system in 
which percepts are represented. Thus, the image is not sensory or pic-
torial, but is a mental representation of the underlying "logically in-
dependent descriptive propositions" (Pylyshyn, 1973, p. 7). Its appears, 
then, that the empirical question suggested by these theories involves 
the relationship between an image and a percept. 
The relationship between an image and a percept was investigated 
directly by Segal and Gordon (1969) when they successfully blocked 
visual signals with visual imagery. The study was a re-evaluation and 
further investigation of the Perky effect. Perky (1910) had discov-
ered that an image may be used to mask perception of an ordinarily su-
praliminal stimulus and that an image may pick up aspects of an 
unreported stimulus. Segal and Gordon (1969) hypothesized that the 
imagined object represents a source of internal noise which effective-
ly reduces the signal-to-noise ratio of the neural activity and thus 
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interferes with the detection of the visual signal during the imagery 
tasks. 
Segal and Fusella (1970) investigated the Perky effect and in-
cluded tasks (imagining and detecting percepts) in different and same 
modalities (auditory and visuai), and found the greatest disruption 
when the tasks were in the same modalities. Thus, imagery does not 
cut down on general attention, but has the specific effect of inter-
fering with the perception in the same modality. In a related study, 
Segal and Fusella (1971) also found that imagery in the auditory, gus-
tatory, tactile and kinesthetic modes all have an effect (though much 
slighter than that of visual imagery) on the detection of the visual 
signal. 
When imagery is in the same mode (i.e., visual), Segal (1971) 
feels that the visual stimulus may be assimilated to the image (i.e., 
the visual signal is processed only to the extent that it relates to 
the visual image) and that, therefore, it is unavailable for detection 
as an external stimulus. He thus seems to be in agreement with Neis-
ser (1967) as to the selective nature of perception. 
Segal and Glicksman (1967) found that body position will influ-
ence the critical ability of the_§_ to notice the stimulus in the Perky 
paradigm. Thus, when relaxed, the S's imagery influences his percep-
tions, while when he is alert, the S's imagery is influenced by his 
perceptions. When the body is in a supine position (a position as-
sociated with relaxation), Segal and Glicksman found that the S failed 
to notice the stimulus. In a sitting position (a position more as-
sociated with alertness), however, they found that the_§_ was more 
likely to notice the stimulus. Finally, while standing (a body 
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position even more associated with activity and alertness) the~ had 
the lowest threshold and detected the greatest number of stimuli. Ac-
cording to Segal (1971) the supine body position allows relaxation, 
and a sensory signal in the same mode as the image is assimilated into 
the image. Hence, the unique qualities of the stimulus are lost since 
the stimulus is processed only as it is related to the ~'s image. The 
more upright body position, on the other hand, alerts the~ to a sig-
nal detection situation and the image itself is accomodated by the 
stimulus. In this instance, then, the properties of the stimulus sug-
gest the properties of the image. 
Segal combines results from her own work with evidence from other 
research and concludes that images, in general, differ from percepts 
in that they are less vivid, smaller, less clearly defined and less 
stable (Segal, 1971). Thus, her work supports Neisser's (1967) con-
tention that an image is a weaker reconstruction of a visual percept. 
Further, Neisser (1967) would also agree that the expectations set up 
by the image could influence the percept. Conversely, since images 
are reconstructions of perceptions, the percepts in the Perky paradigm 
(as when~ was in the alert positions in the Segal and Glicksman 
[1967] study) could influence the image. It is difficult to see how 
such influences can be explained by Pylyshyn's (1973) notion of the 
underlying proposition. While the perception can be seen to be capa-
ble of influencing images in his theory, the manner in which an image 
might influence a perception does not appear to be clear. 
Brooks (1967, 1968) also found interference between visual per-
ception and visual imagery. He presented ~'s with instructions to 
place digits in certain positions in a matrix. The instructions were 
given either verbally or verbally and in written form. The results of 
his experiments showed that reading the instructions interferes with 
the "internal representation of the spatial information" (Brooks, 
1967, p. 298). When the S's responded in a manner which involved 
reading (the ~'shad to underline the word which had been given to 
them in the instructions) as opposed to just saying the words given in 
the instructions, the reading again interfered with the image of the 
matrix. In another study (Brooks, 1968) subjects were instructed to 
form an image of a letter (in block form) and classified the corners 
in the letter as an extreme corner (top or bottom of the letter) or an 
intermediate corner. Another condition had ~'s classify parts of 
speech in sentences. Subjects thus worked in either a spatial or a 
verbal mode. When their response to the task was in the same mode, 
there was again interference in the response (i.e., the response time 
to complete the task was longer). The fact that Brooks found inter-
ference even though "only two subjects reported anything which could 
correspond to a clear image" (Brooks, 1967, p. 298) substantiates the 
claim that visualization of an image involves the visual system wheth-
er or not the individual claims to have vivid imagery, much as sug-
gested by Hebb (196 7) when he proposed that the difference in "having" 
or "not having" imagery was actually only a difference in the ability 
to retrieve the image. 
Seamon and Gazzaniga (1973) have shown that verbal and imagery 
coding strategies have been specialized in the left and right hemi-
spheres, respectively. In their task, which involved short-term 
recognition rather than concurrent activities, I's did match a visual 
image with a pictorial probe presented in the left visual field faster 
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than if presented in the right visual field. The authors conclude 
that imagery (i.e., generated visual information) should be included 
as part of the visual processing system. Their work, then, can be in-
terpreted as arguing for the position that images, like perceptions, 
are pictorial. 
Weber and Harnish (1974) tested Hebb's "picture theory" of 
visually imagining words. Hebb had concluded that a subject's in~ 
ability to spell a word, such as "university," as rapidly backwards as 
forwards was proof that having an image is not like having a picture 
in the mind at which another part of the mind can look (Weber and Har-
nish, 1974). Weber and Harnish suggested, however, that a long word 
such as "university" might overtax the visual imagery system. They 
suggested instead that a test with a shorter word, e.g., "toy," would 
be just as valid a test of the theory and would not tax the visual 
imagery system. Using three and five letter words, they used a probe 
technique to test objectively the subjects' images of the words. In 
some conditions they found that imagery and perceptual representations 
were comparable in the response time required for processing. They 
suggested that 
there exists a visual image operating memory with a 
fixed letter capacity for parallel processing that is less 
than that of the visual percept system. When the image 
capacity of the operating memory is strained or exceeded, 
differences in processing time between percept and image 
systems become apparent (Weber and Harnish, p. 30). 
Thus, visual imagery does seem from the above evidence (Segal and 
Gordon, 1969; Segal and Fusella, 1970; Segal and Glicksman, 1967; 
Brooks, 1967; Seamon and Gazzaniga, 1973) to involve the visual sys-
tern. Indeed, while Pylyshyn would disagree, visual imagery has been 
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called "generated visual information" (Seamon and Gazzaniga, 1973, p. 
255). Logically one would hypothesize, then, that phenomena which af-
fect visual perception might also act to affect visual imagery. As 
blinking is one manner in which humans control perceptual input, it 
might also play a part in controlling imagery. The next section will 
explore this hypothesis. 
Blinking as a Visual Mask 
Ponder and Kennedy (1927) concluded from their investigations in-
to the causation of blinking that such movements were centrally origi-
nated (although they could also be influenced along certain secondary 
paths such as the optic and auditory nerves). This central control of 
blinking was reflected in the fact that a change in rate of blinking 
would result from a change in the general level of attention of the 
individual. They employed some fascinating naturalistic observations 
to come to this conclusion. Observing witnesses in a court of law, 
for example, they discovered that the rate of blinking increased re-
markably when the witness was under cross-examination as opposed to 
being questioned under direct examination. Other evidence was 
gathered from observations of men and women passengers on street cars 
and in the reading rooms of libraries. Different results were found 
for both men and women in the two different situations. On the street 
cars women were observed to have much lower blink rates than the men 
supposedly because the women were ~uch more introspective in their at-
tention, while the men were much more engaged in attending to their ex-
ternal environment. The investigators had much more difficulty in 
gathering data from the reading.rooms and in this instance, the 
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results were exactly the opposite. That is, the blink rates of the 
men were much lower blink rates than those of the women. This finding 
was explained by the greater tendency of the men to study, while the 
women's attention wandered around the room. Ponder and Kennedy's ex-
periments lead them to the general conclusion that blinking is related 
tb mental tension. Another conclusion, however, might be that the 
cause of blinking is not so much mental tension as it is the amount 
and kind of attention the person is paying to his surroundings. 
Similar eyidence is presented in Hall's (1945) discussion of 
blinking. This researcher saw blinks as being of two types: volun-
tary and reflex. Reflexive blinks include automatic blinks for the 
protection and efficient action of the eyes, blinks for the preserva-
tion of the organism (which according to Hall are the most frequent 
kind of everyday blinks), and blinks of technique such as those which 
occur during the act of reading .aloud. 
In preface to his discussion of the blinks involved in the pre-
servation of the organism, Hall (1945) points out that blinks (and 
absence of blinks) are the result of inherited reflexes of aggression 
and self-preservation. The carnivora or hunting animals represent 
characteristics of aggression as their sole means of getting food is 
through attack on other animals which are usually far away, highly 
mobile and highly resistent (Hall, 1945). The herbivora (the animals 
which are hunted) represent the opposite in food gathering aspects. 
Their food supply is usually nearby, stationary and non-resisting. 
These animals are often prey to the carnivora, however, and thus, 
self-preservation is manifested in nearly constant vigilance. These 
two basic reflexes (of "aggression" and "self-preservation") meet as 
opposites in the eye and the eyeblink. 
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The manifestations of these two reflexes are displayed in the 
blinking behaviors of animals. Blount (1927) observed animals in the 
Edinburgh Zoo and found the average blink rates of several species of 
animals. Carnivora blinked much less frequently (on the average 2.0 
times per minute) than did the herbivora (on the average 10.5 times 
per minute). Hall concludes from this data that blinking is highly 
correlated with the relative importance of the self-preservation and 
aggression reflexes in the two groups of animals. Blount found an 
even higher average rate of blinking (24 per minute) in aboreal pri-
mates. He attributes the increase not to a greater need for self-
preservation (having taken to the trees the animals are "safer" than 
the herbivora still on the ground), but rather he attributes it to de-
pendence on a new and ever changing use of the fixation reflex. Fixa-
tion has changed from the prolonged fixation at stalked prey to the 
rapid adjustment to and ever constant interest in looking-about an 
ever changing environment (Hall, 1945). 
Blinking in man has been found to vary greatly under different 
circumstances (Ponder and Kennedy's [1927] data show a range of 3.29 
per minute to 25.4 per minute). Yet, the human blink rate is, on the 
whole, greater than that of lower animals and is somewhat comparable 
to the primates of Blount's study. While man shows the same respon-
siveness to the self-preservation reflexes (the acoustic reflex and 
the menace reflex) as do the lower animals, he also reacts to imagi-
nary threats arising from emotional or nervous causes. Thus, these 
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blinks allow for a cutting short of the fixation reflex without caus-
ing an interruption in the continuity of vision. 
Blinks of technique, on the other hand, are meant to interrupt 
the visual input signal. Thus, Hall (1945) found that when reading 
aloud, the accomplished reader blinks at appropriate places (usually 
at punctuation marks) and for appropriate duration (depending on the 
type of punctuation mark) in order to delay the outflow of the text in 
his speech. There is no change of fixation and reading picks up again 
at the same point. 
Telford and Thompson (1932) measured blink rates of subjects un-
der three conditions. When blink rate during conversation is taken as 
normal, reading was found to retard blink rate and mental arithmetic 
was found to increase blink rate. The authors do not attribute the 
drop in blink rate during reading to mental activity, but rather sug-
gest several other factors which may be responsible for it. Among the 
other factors is the fact that "excessive winking interferes with the 
process of reading" (Telford and Thompson, 1932, p. 536). Telford and 
Thompson's (1932) evidence is again indicative of the fact that in-
creased attention to the individual's surroundings is accompanied by 
an increase in blink rate. 
Baumstimler and Parrot (1971) investigated the relationship be-
tween spontaneous blinking and a voluntary motor task. They found 
that their subjects' (~'s) blinks occured in the time period after the 
onset of the motor response had occured and before the onset of the 
next stimulus. The blinks were inhibited in the time period between 
onset of the stimulus and the beginning of the response. The active 
process was hypothesized to be the inhibition of blinking during the 
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period between the ~'s first expectancy of the stimulus and when the 
response is given. The inhibition of blinking, then, occurs when the 
~ is monitoring a numerical indicator three feet in front of him, 
awaiting a visual signal. In a previous study the mean blink rates 
of subjects involved in reading and in fixation upon a nearby object 
. 
were found to be "practically equal" (Peterson and Allison, 1931, p. 
147). The results are interpreted as meaning that blinking can be 
voluntarily monitored so as not to interfere with task demands. 
Stated in another way, the results can be interpreted as showing that 
blinking can be inhibited when the individual is fixating on or close-
ly monitoring an object in his environment. 
Broadbent (1958) agrees that man can monitor his environment in 
order to know when to blink and when not to blink. Blinks cut off in-
formation to the nervous system instantaneously. This does little 
harm, however, since man can suspend blinking and he can control his 
blinks so that he will blink only when he is relatively sure that no 
new information will be arriving at that time. He can also continue 
to act even though he is not taking in information at that precise 
point in time. 
Several investigators have noted that blinking is related in 
some way to various mental states. Collins (1962), for instance, sug-
gested that the blinking rate is higher during emotional excitement 
and that it is lower during daydreaming. Antrobus, Antrobus and 
Singer (1964) found that S's who were asked to generate a wish blinked 
less often than S's asked to suppress a wish. Holland and Tarlow 
(1972) hypothesized that blinking disrupts certain cognitive processes 
and that blinks therefore occur in gaps between processes. Increased 
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mental load would decrease the availability of such gaps and therefore 
the opportunity for blinking would be decreased. 
In the first part of Holland and Tarlow's (1972) experiment, the 
subjects were seated facing a wall on which was a large black patch 
located at eye level. The ..§_'s were auditorially presented a series of 
numbers randomly varied in length (4, 6, or 8 digits). The "S's task 
was to look at the black patch and visualize (italics added) the 
series of numbers they had just heard, until a signal tone sounded 70 
seconds later. At this signal, S was asked to repeat the original 
digits out loud in the same order as they were presented" (Holland 
and Tarlow, 1972, p. 121). As the digit span increased (an event 
which Holland and Tarlow took to represent an increase in mental 
load), the number of errors increased. The fewer digits being visua-
lized (i.e., th.e smaller the mental load) the higher was the blink 
rate. These results may also be interpreted (contrary to Holland and 
Tarlow) as being indicative of the fact that the subjects could main-
tain a few digits easily, but that they had to concentrate more 
heavily on internal processes in order to maintain larger numbers of 
digits. To do this, fewer blinks could be tolerated. 
In the second part of this study, subjects were involved in a 
mental arithmetic task in which they were instructued "to keep a run-
ning total of the numbers by visualizing (italics added) the addition 
on the black patch and to respond with the cumulative total at the 
sound of the signal tone" (Holland and Tarlow, 1972, p. 121). In this 
part of the experiment ..§_'s made more errors on addition not involving 
zeros and on addition involving two-digit numbers. The S's also 
blinked more on trials containing zeros than on those not containing 
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zeros. Again, the results seem to show that the more concentration 
required for the mental visualization task, the less interference from 
the effects of blinking could be tolerated. 
Indeed, in both parts of the study there were more blinks pre-
ceding incorrect trials than there were preceding correct ones. The 
authors conclude that the results indicate that when mental load is 
reduced, the rate of blinking will increase. Moreover, they further 
suggest, "It would be adaptive to inhibit blinks during mental acti-
vities if blinks disrupted certain cognitive processes" (Holland and 
Tarlow, 1972, p. 127). If vision and visual imagery share the same 
processing channels and if blinks tend to bring external stimuli into 
brighter focus, which in turn masks the visual image (either by light 
or patterns), then it would, indeed, be quite adaptive to inhibit 
blinking when engaged in such an act of visual imagery. 
Along these lines, Weitzenhoffer (1969) tested the "unblinking 
stare" as being a characteristic of hypnosis. His results showed that 
subjects considered to be "appreciably" hypnotized did "show~ marked-
J:y decreased rate of spontaneous blinking" (Weitzenhoffer, 1969, p. 
674). In seeking to explain his findings, Weitzenhoffer offers the 
same type of "selective attention" hypothesis suggested above. As he 
suggests, 
Speaking only in somewhat of a clinical manner at this 
time, it has seemed to this investigator after watching 
many individuals strongly attending to various stimuli, 
particularly those calling for an inward turning of at-
tention, that attending is often accompanied by reduced 
blinking, or at least by the appearance of short bursts 
of blinking with relatively long intervals free of blink-
ing. If so, and if hypnosis is a form of concentrated or 
selective attention, as has been proposed many times, one 
might expect a reduction in blink rate with hypnosis 
(Weitzenhoffer, 1969, p. 675). 
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The importance of selective attention has been noticed in other 
studies. The concentration (attending to one thought or goal) as 
found in many cognitive tasks and in some emotional arousal is associ-
ated with reduced blink rates. General emotional arousal not associ-
ated with a specific goal, shifts in attention, and, perhaps thought 
suppression, on the other hand, are associated with increased fre-
quency in blinking (Barron, 1973). As discussed above, blinking has 
also been shown to be associated with disruption of a cognitive task 
involving visualization (i.e., imagery) (Holland and Tarlow, 1972). 
Further investigation is needed to examine whether blinking itself 
disrupts the visual imagery process and, if it do~s, in what manner. 
As was suggested earlier, the act of blinking suggests some of 
the elements present in the masking paradigms. Kahneman's (1968) re-
view of the masking literature defines "visual masking" as "the class 
of situations in which some measure of the effectiveness of a visual 
stimulus (the test stimulus, TS) is reduced by the presentation of 
another (the masking stimulus, MS) in close temporal contiguity to it" 
(p. 404). Backward masking occurs when the MS follows the TS; forward 
masking occurs when the TS follows the MS. Masking can be by light 
(in which a flash of homogeneous illumination is used) or by pattern 
(in which regular or random arrays of white and dark areas are used). 
Masking using random patterns is sometimes termed "masking by visual 
noise" (Kahneman, 1968, p. 405). When the MS and TS are not spatially 
·overlapping, backward masking is termed "metacontrast" and forward 
masking is termed "paracontrast" although, as Kahneman (1968, p. 405) 
points out·, the term metacontrast is generally applied to both situ-
ations. 
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Using these terms, then, the situation in which an individual has 
an image and then blinks (rapidly closes and opens his eyes once) can 
be seen as an instance of forward masking (if the blink actually 
causes a delay in the formation of the next image) and of backward 
masking (if the blink actually causes an "erasure" of the preceding 
image). Indeed, two characteristics of masking with light which have 
been confirmed repeatedly are: (1) the masking flash interferes with 
TS, both when it precedes the TS (forward masking) and when it follows 
the TS (backward masking) and (2) the forward and backward masking ef-
fects are both most severe when the TS and the MS follow one another 
immediately (Kahneman, 1968) as they do in the blinking situation. 
In discussing theories of visual masking, Kahneman (1968) re-
ports, 
All current theories of backward masking share a cen-
tral idea: the visual response to a brief stimulus lasts 
longer than did the stimulus that caused it; consequently, 
the responses to two successive stimuli may overlap in 
time (Kahneman, 1968, p. 419). 
Thus, backward masking is not really a retroactive event, but rather 
it is caused by an interaction between responses which are at least 
partly concurrent. With this in mind, the author presents two general 
groups of theories concerning the interaction effect which occurs when 
the TS and MS overlap. The integration theories basically assume that 
the TS and the MS are linearly summed so that any response to "their 
presentation in sequence is the same as would be evoked by their joint 
simultaneous presentation" (Kahneman, 1968, p. 420). Thus, if the 
system is being overloaded by massive stimulation of the MS, it "is 
less capable of conveying information about TS" (Kahneman, 1968, p. 
420). In the interruption theories, on the other hand, the idea 
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emphasized is that "the normal perception of a TS requires time and 
that the process may be stopped by a stimulus presented during that 
time" (Kahneman, 1968, p. 420). 
Turvey (1973) also discusses the integration and interruption 
theories of masking. This researcher has investigated the peripheral 
and central processes of vision involved in masking in terms of an in-
formation processing model. In the visual information processing sys-
tem information goes first to iconic memory and then is recoded into a 
categorical form before representation in response and/or short-term 
storage. 
The interruption hypothesis localizes the effect of 
backward masking by pattern subsequent to iconic storage. 
It is assumed that a clear icon is established and that 
an 'after-coming' pattern interferes with the translation 
into categorical form. The time needed to effect that 
translation is cut short by the after-coming stimulus. 
The integration hypothesis on the other hand, proposes 
that target material and mask are dealt with as a com-
posite, resulting in an unintelligible icon. For the in-
tegration hypothesis, the effect of an after-coming pat-
tern is on the formation of the target iconic represen-
tation so that it never achieves the acuity, contrast or 
clarity that it would have attained in the absence of the 
mask (Turvey, 1973, p. 3). 
In a long series of experiments in which the TS and MS were presented 
to the same hemiretina of one eye or to different hemiretinas (one in 
each eye), Turvey was able to direct the TS and MS through one channel 
or to the same hemisphere through separate channels. Thus, the author 
was able. to control for masking occuring peripherally or centrally. 
He found, 
In short, there ~re two possible loci for the percep-
tual impairment resulting when two visual stimuli follow 
in rapid succession. The impairment may have its locus in 
the transmission channel or in a central processor. Im-
pairment localized in the transmission channel is best 
viewed as the effect one stimulus exerts on the other. 
Impairment localized in a central processor can be of two 
sorts: an interaction between the stimuli, similar in 
kind to that occuring in the transmission channel, or a 
distortion induced in the operation of a central processing 
mechanism (Turvey, 1973, p. 18). 
Turvey proposes instead a concurrent-contingent model of visual 
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masking. In the model, central and peripheral processing act concur-
rently and are overlapping in time. The central processes are, how-
ever, contingent upon the output of the peripheral processes. In 
particular, Turvey's experiments resulted in his drawing several con-
clusions about masking in the peripheral and central systems. He con-
eluded, for instance, that in the peripheral system both forward and 
backward masking can occur. The masking in the peripheral system de-
pends upon the energy levels of the two competing stimuli so that the 
stimulus of greater energy is the one most likely to be perceived. In 
the central processing situation, on the other hand, energy is not im-
portant in the competition of two stimuli. Rather the competition is 
resolved by the later stimulus being most completely identified. 
Thus, backward masking occurs to the greatest degree in central pro-. 
cessing, while forward masking is relatively weak. 
Several of Turvey's (1973) findings have implications for the 
suggestion that masking in the imagery-blink-imagery situation might 
.. 
occur centrally. These include the effectiveness of backward masking, 
the fact that forward masking has been observed which delayed rather 
than impaired the recognition of-a test item and the wide range of in-
dividual differences found in central masking. Further, while "peri-
pheral" and "central" are not fully defined in Turvey's model, imagery 
itself occurs centrally and thus could not be masked peripherally. 
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Thus, as Raab has concluded, the findings of forward and backward 
masking studies have shown that "unhindered perception of a target re-
quires that it be 'surrounded in time'--i.e., preceded and followed--
by zones devoid of masking energy" (Raab, 1963, p. 125). It is sug-
gested here that the eyeblink acts in some manner to introduce such a 
masking energy. 
Hemispheric Specialization 
The earliest suggestions of human hemispheric specialization were 
the result of "experiments of Nature" in which patients suffering from 
aphas i'c symptons due to hemiplegia or hemiparesis resulting from 
brain injuries were studied (Satz, Ach~nbach, and Fennell, 1967). 
Much of the recent interest in this area, however, has come from the 
research by Sperry and Meyers in the 1950s. Their initial work in-
volved an investigation into the functioning of the commissures (dis-
crete bundles of nerve fibers which link the two cerebral hemispheres) 
and more specifically, of the corpus callosum (the most prominent of 
these links). The commissures "form reciprocal connections between 
parallel centers in the two hemispheres" (Sperry, 1967, p. 240). 
Thus, both the size and the location of the commissures suggested the 
importance of their functioning. 
One of Sperry's graduate students, Ronald E. Myers, subsequently 
developed a technique of "splitting-the-brain" of a cat by surgically 
cutting the corpus callosum (and, in the initial study, the optic 
chiasm). Through post-operative testing, Myers learned that the ac-
tual function of the great cerebral commissure (the corpus callosum) 
was to transmit information between the two hemispheres of the brain. 
Testing the performance of the two brain halves separately, 
he found that when the corpus callosum was cut, what was 
learned by one side of the brain was not transferred to the 
other side. In fact, the two sides could learn diametri-
cally opposed solutions to the same experimental problem, 
so that the animal's response in a given situation depended 
on which side of the brain was receiving the triggering 
stimulus. It was as though each hemisphere were a separate 
mental domain operating with complete disregard--indeed, 
with a complete lack of awareness--of what went on in the 
other. The split-brain animal behaved in the test situation 
as if it had two entirely separate brains (Sperry, 1967, p. 
241). 
Post-operative testing techniques developed by Sperry and his 
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colleagues for use on human patients whose corpus callosum had inten-
tionally been surgically severed (usually in an attempt to control 
epileptic seizures) later gave more specific information about hemi-
spheric specialization (Sperry, 1967, 1968; Gazzaniga, 1970). Sperry 
(1967) gives numerous examples of tests given such patients and the 
deficiencies in performance shown by them. In testing the patients a 
special testing set-up is used. It allows the experimenters to do 
lateralized testing for right and left visual fields (separately or 
together) and to do lateralized testing of right and left arms and 
legs with vision excluded (Sperry, 1967, 1968; 'Gazzaniga, 1970). 
Handedness and footedness are aspects of cerebral lateralization 
which are readily apparent to most people. There has been much con-
troversy over the connection between this aspect of hemispheric spe-
cialization and other aspects such as speech and language specializa-
tion (Milner, Branch and Rasmussen, 1973). The question revolves 
around the relationship of handedness to the location of speech later-
alization. That is, since it is overwhelmingly accepted that right 
handed individuals have speech specialization in the left hemisphere, 
does it follow that left handers have speech lateralization in the 
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right hemisphere? Further, is speech lateralization always completely 
lateralized? These questions become quite important in situations in 
which left-handed, ambidextrous and sometimes right-handed patients 
are candidates for neurosurgery. The Wada test was developed for 
quick and precise determination of speech specialization so that 
speech abilities would not be disturbed during neurosurgery. The test 
consists of blocking processing in one hemisphere at a time (one side 
on each of two days) with an intracarotid artery injection of sodium 
amytal (Milner, Branch and Rasmussen, 1973; Satz, Achenbach and Fen-
nel, 1967) and then testing patients with verbal processing tasks. 
Milner, Branch and Rasmussen report the results of tests of 119 pa-
tients which showed that ninety percent of right-handed patients (and 
these were patients suspected for some reason not to have speech spe-
cialization in the left hemisphere) did show speech specialization in 
te left hemisphere. Of the left-handed patients, on the other hand, 
over twenty percent of the patients in each of two groups (those with 
and those without early left brain damage) also had speech specializa-
tion in the left hemisphere. Furthermore, all instances of bilateral 
speech representation were in the left-handed groups. These results 
present further evidence that while language specialization is rela-
tively distinct in right handers, it is not distinct in left handers. 
Of course, since use of the test is limited to candidates for neuro-
surgery, its results are often criticized as coming from non-normai 
subjects (Satz, Achenbach and Fennel, 1967). 
Levy (1969) has presented an hypothesis concerning the evolu-
tional basis of lateral specialization of the human brain. Based on 
the fact that there is some evidence for minimal right hemisphere 
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ability for language processing which is overshadowed by the stronger 
control of the left hemisphere over motor mechanisms for speech pro-
duction, he proposed that specialization was "an adaptation permittjng 
control of the unique vocal apparatus, uncomplicated by competitive 
antagonism between hemispheres" (Levy, 1969, p. 615). Levy-Agresti 
and Sperry ( 1968) showed that the right hemisphere is superior in its 
ability to visualize in three dimensions. Further, in such a task the 
left hemisphere seemed to analyze the stimulus properties as if to 
process the information in a manner so as to be described in language, 
while the right hemisphere seemed to process in a manner so as to 
grasp the stimulus Gestalt (i.e., an integrated whole of the stimu-
lus). This researcher suggests, then, "During the evolution of 
the hominids Gestalt perception may have lateralized into the mute 
hemisphere as a consequence of an antagonism between functions of lan-
guage and perception" (Levy, 1969, p. 615). Testing left- and right-
handed graduate science students on the verbal and performance scales 
of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), he found the antago-
nistic hypothesis confirmed. That is, the left-handers (~'s taken to 
have bilateral language centers or partial language competence in both 
hemispheres) did more poorly than right-handers (~'s with dominant 
language ability in the left hemisphere alone) on the performance 
scales, while there was no difference between the two groups on the 
verbal scales. 
Filbey and Gazzaniga (1969) were among the first researchers to 
suggest splitting the normal brain with reaction time. Their first 
experiment involved having ~'s give either verbal or manual responses 
to either the presence or absence of a dot or a blank field in right 
or left visual fields. Since verbal responses r'estrict responses to 
the left hemisphere, a dot presented ih the RVF should result in a 
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faster reaction time than a dot in the LVF. Further, since there must 
be callosal transmission of information between left and right hemi-
sphere~ before a totally blank field may be indicated(~ must check 
both sides for "no dotll)~ responding to a blank field should also take 
longer. The results showed that discrimination of a left dot and of a 
blank field took 30-40 msec. longer than discrimination of a right 
dot. Similarly, in a motor response both hemispheres can have access 
to the response. Thus, there should be no left-right difference in 
detecting dots, but detection of a blank field should again necessi-
tate callosal transmission of information across the hemispheres and 
thus result in longer reaction times. Again, these results were found 
with the blank field detection taking 30-40 msec. longer than either 
left or right dot detection. 
Gibson, Filbey and Gazzaniga (1970) presented a dot to either 
left or right visual fields and required a simple verbal response 
("e" = "yes," "c" = "no"), and replicated the finding that the dot 
presented to the left visual field takes 30 msec. longer in which to 
respond. This result is obtained because information presented to the 
silent (right) hemisphere must be transferred to the speaking (left) 
hemisphere before the subject can respond. In addition, the research-
ers used a mental rotation task which required rotation and matching 
of two figures (e.g.' .f .r - "yes' II r ! - "no"). It was expected that 
such a task presented to the left hemisphere would require transfer to 
.. 
the right hemisphere for processing and then transfer back to the left 
hemisphere for the verbal response. Ten of_ twelve subject's showed a 
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RVF superiority on the first task, and eleven showed a LVF superiority 
on the second task. 
Geffen, Bradshaw and Wallace (1971) suggest that in using re-
sponse time measures with normal subjects, visual field differences 
could be due either to time needed to cross from non-dominant hemi-
sphere to the dominant hemisphere (for specialized processing of a 
particular type) or to merely better efficiency of one hemisphere in 
processing of that particular type or to both (i.e., to both hemi-
spheric asymmetry and to interhemispheric transmission times). 
Dimond, Gibson and Gazzaniga (1972) tested subjects on their ability 
to match words presented either in one visual field or simultaneously 
in both left and right visual fields. They found that when the stimu-
li was presented in both visual fields there was an increase in errors 
(as compared to presentation in either left or right field alone). 
The results were interpreted as suggesting that "combining of informa-
tion from both visual fields require its transmission across the cor-
pus callosum," and that "information is lost during this process" 
(Dimond, Gibson and Gazzaniga, 1972, p. 379). 
Kinsbourne (1970), on the other hand, proposes that asymmetries 
in processing information from visual fields arise "when preponderant 
cerebral activation of one hemisphere biases attention to the contra-
lateral sidi'(Kinsbourne, 1970, p. 193). As a vestige of earlier bio-
logical adaptation, Kinsbourne suggests, 
Expectancy of a briefly exposed word or letter induces 
preparatory left hemisphere activation, and thus biases at-
tention somewhat to the right of the fixation point, even 
though central fixation be strictly maintained. When the 
display actually appears on that side, more processing time 
is available than when it appears on the other side, 
necessitating a shift of attention. This, like any bio-
logical process, is not instantaneous (Kinsbourne, 1970, 
p. 196). 
Hemispheric specialization has also been found for nonverbal 
8timu1 L Doreen Kimura (1966) showed the verbal superiority of 
the left hemisphere (i.e., right visual field superiority for recog-
nition of letters) and a right hemisphere superiority for nonverbal 
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1fu~terial (i.e., left visual field superiority for dots, though not for 
nonsense forms). Kimura (1969), in a series of seven experiments, 
found that dots can be more accurately located when presented in the 
left visual field. She further found that this difference could not 
be attributed simply to differences in the ease in which a dot can be 
seen in tl1e left visual field. She suggests a spatial co-ordinate 
system in the right hemisphere which mediates the representation of 
t•xternal space. 
Rizzolatti, Umilta, and Berlucchi (1971) compared left and right 
vistwl field presentations of verbal (capital letters) and nonverbal 
(pictures of unknown persons) stimuli. They found the expected right 
visual field superiority for letters and left visual field superiority 
for the pictures. Evidence that task requirements are very important 
is found when it is noticed that in previous work (Rizzolatti et al., 
1971) no visual field superiority wai found for pictures of faces. In 
the earlier study, however, the pictures used were sketches of faces 
of famous persons. This fact may have provided a "verbal loop" as 
subjects named the faces. 
Muscovitch ( 1972) also found differences in the manner in which 
alphabetic letters can be processed. Using response times as his de-
pendent variable, he presented letters (one or six) binaurally to his 
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subjects and had them report (with a manual response) whether a test 
letter (presented visually in left or right visual fields) matched a 
letter in the memory set. When the memory set contained only one let-
ter, there was a left visual field superiority. When the memory set 
contained six letters, however, there was a right visual field superi-
ority. This led Moscovitch to conclude that when the subjects had 
only one letter in the memory set, they matched the test letter to it 
visually (in accordance to the right hemisphere's ability to process 
visual information); when the subjects had six letters in the memory 
set, they matched the test letter verbally (in accordance with the 
left hemisphere's ability to process verbal information). 
Klatzky (1970) compared nonverbal and verbal stimuli in a 
matching task. In this experiment, however, letters were considered 
to be nonverbal because they were treated as spatial objects and were 
compared to the memory set in terms of their physical configurations. 
Pictures of common objects served as the verbal stimuli because S's 
made the memory comparisons between verbal labels for the pictures. 
Stimuli were presented to either left or right visual fields, and the 
subjects responded if the stimulus matched one of a previously pre-
sented set (or, in the case of the pictures, if the first letter of 
the name of the pictured object matched a letter in the memory set). 
The results of the experiment showed the expected left visual field 
superiority for nonverbal processing of letters and the right visual 
field superiority for verbal processing of letters. Klatzky also in-
cluded memory set size (of 2 to 5 letters) as one variable. She found 
left visual field superiority for all set sizes in processing of letters. 
However, in the processing of pictures, there was RVF superiority in 
small memory set size (two letters) and LVF superiority for large 
memory sets (three to five letters). This shows a shift from verbal 
to nonverbal processing as memory set size increased. Klatzky sug-
gests that one possibility is that 
the transfer of information from the right to the left 
hemisphere has a facilitative effect on the comparison 
process. It is also possible that presenting a picture 
to the left hemisphere, where comparisons ar~ supposed 
to take place, makes the comparison process more diffi-
cult. A third possibility is that some picture cduld 
be equated with its corresponding letter without the 
aid of verbalization, enabling the right hemisphere to 
perform spatial comparisons when it receives a picture 
stimulus (Klatzky, 1970, p. 203). 
Harnish (1974) further suggests that imagery might have been used in 
some way in the larger memory set. Seamon and Gazzaniga (1973), for 
instance, found that imagery coding produced faster latencies for 
probes to the right hemisphere in a short-term recognition memory 
task. 
As White (1971) reported, the evidence showing a right visual 
field superiority for alphabetic letters, the fact that stimuli pre-
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sented in the right visual field are transmitted directly to the left 
hemisphere, and the fact that the left hemisphere is dominant for me-
diation of languages "have led to the proposition that cerebral lan-
guage dominance can account for certain aspects of visual laterality 
differences" (White, 1971, p. 207). He presented subjects letters in 
right and left visual fields and found a RVF superiority. In a second 
experiment, however, subjects had to discriminate the orientations of 
straight lines presented to.them. In this instance, White also found 
I 
a RVF superiority. These results suggested to him that there is some-
I thing in common about discriminating line orientations and the 
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perception of letters. He suggests, "A commonality is the correct 
discrimination of contours; what distinguishes an A from an His the 
orientation of the two side elements" (White, 1971., p. 210). He sug-
gests that his results are "explicable in terms of a selective con-
tour-tuni.ng apparatus" (White, 1971, p. 210), such as described by 
Hubel and Wiesel (1965, 1968). One problem with his work, however, is 
that he used a vocal response in each case, and thu~ may have biased 
his results. 
Geffen, Bradshaw and Nettleson (1972) found hemispheric assymme-
try for differential encoding (verbal and spatial) of visual stimuli. 
Letters presented tachistoscopically were to be responded to as same 
or difforent according to physical properties (e.g., "A-A") or accor-
<ling to their name (e.g., "A-a"). Letters similar in name were found 
to have a right visual superiority (i.e., were ~rocessed faster in the 
left, language, hemisphere) while letters having identical physical 
properties were found to have left visual field superiority (i.e., 
were processed faster in the right, spatial hemisphere). The authors 
conclude, 
The finding of faster processing of physically iden-
tical stimuli when these are directed to the right hemi-
sphere suggests that the type of task is more important 
than the type of stimulus in determining hemispheric 
asymmetry. When analysis of visual patterns is required, 
the right hemisphere is better (Geffen et al., 1972, p. 
30). 
Gibson, Dimond and Gazzaniga (1972) first presented words to 
their subjects in a spatial matching task and later in a verbal task, 
i.e., reading the word. Their results indicated a left visual field 
superiority for the matching test (contrary to most findings involving 
words as stimuli). Further, they suggest that word recognition is a 
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multistage process and thus cannot be invariably handled better by one 
or the other hemispheres. Rather, they conclude!, "Treating a word as 
a Vl'rbal stimulus would seem to be justified only when the task 
stressed language related properties.. Whether or not a right field 
supcrlor:ity will manifest. itself is not dictated by the st:imu]us alone 
hut also depends upon the interaction of task and stimulus" (Gibson 
et ~~·, 1972, p. 465). 
Seamon and Gazzaniga (1973) had subjects engage in a short-term 
memory task. The S's saw two simple nouns (e.g., HAT, DUCK), on a 
rear projection screen. Then they were probed in one hemisphere by 
presentation.of a line drawing of a pictorial representation of one of 
the two study items. Both positive (a drawing of one of the objects) 
and negative (a drawing of an unrelated object) probes were used. Subjects 
used either a verbal rehearsal code or an imagery code. Thus, sub-
jects "were told to rehearse the two study words subvocally and con-
tinually during their presentation and the blank period preceding the 
probe" or they "were instructed to generate an imaginal representation 
of each of the study words, and to put the two images together into a 
s:lngle interactive scene so that one image was always touching the 
other image" (Seamon and Gazzaniga, 1973, p. 251). The S's in the 
verbal rehearsal condition were to indicate if the picture probe re-
presented one of the two study items, while the S's in the imagery 
condition were to indicate if the picture represented one of the ob-
jects imagined in the scene. The results indicated that "cerebral 
laterality effects are functionally related to coding strategies" 
(Seamon and Gazzaniga, 1973, p. 253). Thus, faster reaction times 
were found for probes to the left hemisphere when S's were using the 
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verbal rehearsal strategy. Similarly, faster reactions were found for 
probes to the right hemisphere when S's were using the imagery code. 
The authors state, 
In summary, these data support the original hypothesis 
that varying coding strategies can produce cerebral later-
ality effects consistent with the model of separate proces-
sing systems, and argue for the inclusion of imagery, or 
generated visual information, as part of the visual pro-
cessing system. As such, generated visual information may 
be viewed as a coding alterriative to verbal mediation. 
(Seamon and Gazzaniga, 1973, p. 255). 
Paivio and Ernest (1971) reasoned that if ~'s with high imagery 
ability have an overall ability to process visual material at a per-
ceptual level, then they should show greater tachistoscopic recogni-
tion accuracy for any type stimuli presented. If, however, the theo-
retical and operational definition of imagery identify it in terms of 
figural ability, then there should only be greater tachistoscopic re-
cognition of nonverbal stimuli. They tested the specific hypothesis 
that 
superiority on spatial or figural transformational ability 
tests (i.e., high imagery ability) reflects superior right 
hemisphere functioning. If true, high imagers should be 
more accurate than low imagers, specifically in identify-
ing nonverbal stimuli presented to the left visual field. 
No imagery differences should result when such materials 
are presented to the right visual field nor when verbal 
stimuli are presented to either visual field (Paivio and 
Ernest, 1971, p. 429). 
The task involved recognition of and verbal naming of letters, pie-
tures and geometric forms. The results of the study showed that over-
all, the high imagers did better and showed a right hemisphere superi-
or;ity for .the task. Low imagers, on the other hand, showed a left 
hemisphere superiority for the task. The authors suggest two reasons 
for this difficulty of the right hemisphere: 
It could be right-hemisphere deficiency in the processing 
of visual information concerning forms or relative inef-
ficiency in the transmission of appropriate information 
from the right hemisphere to language control f;ystems in 
the left hemisphere, such information being necessary for 
the initiation of the verbal response that identifies the 
form (Paivio and Ernest, 1971, p. 432). 
The authors concluded, in part, that 
imagery ability is apparently unrelated to letter re-
cognition, but high imagers clearly surpass low imagers 
in picture recognition. These data suggest strongly that 
the superiority of high imagers is specific to nonverbal 
stimuli, although in themselves they do not rule out a 
verbal-processing component in the effect. It could be 
argued, for example, that high imagers may surpass low 
imagers in their ability to code pictures verbally and 
that this ability plays a part in recognition accuracy 
(Paivio and Ernest, 1971, p. 431). 
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Use of a verbal response (thus biasing the left hemisphere) and possi-
ble confounding by inclusion of left handed i's make clear interpre-
tation of the results in this study difficult, however. 
Harnish (1974) also studied imagery processing. He presented 
typed uppercase capital letters one at a time in either the LVF or 
RVF. Subjects were to classify the equivalent lowercase letter as to 
its vertical height as in Weber and Kelley (1972). Responding with a 
bimanual response, the i's response latencies sho~ed faster processing 
in the right hemisphere for this imagery task. 
Thus, the split brain paradigm may offer a technique to better 
isolate visual imagery for study without confounding by verbal pro-
cessing of report information and without confounding through loss of 
information caused by callosal transmission. As suggested by Tur-
vey (1973) the neural pathways which allow the split-brain testing of 
normal subjects to be done also present unique opportunities for 
testing central and peripheral masking effects. Thus, the situation 
is potentially adaptable for testing masking effects on imagery and 
perception. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Twenty-four undergraduate student volunteers enrolled in lower 
division psychology courses were used as subjects (_~'s). They re-
ceived course extra credit for their participation. Twelve S's were 
randomly assigned to each between group condition. All S's had filled 
out the Handedness Questionnaire (Appendix A) adapted from Harnish 
(1974) and their answers indicated that they were right handed (i.e., 
that they had checked "left-hand" or "either hand" no more than twice 
on the questionnaire) and that they had no known left-handedness in 
their immediate family (mother, father, grandparents, brothers, or 
sisters). Since the size of the viewing hood of the tachistoscope 
prohibited the use of S's who wore glasses, the questionnaire also 
screened for this condition. While none of the S's wore glasses, con-
tact lenses were permitted. 
Design 
The design was a Type SPF= 2.224 design (Kirk, 1968, p. 308). 
The between-S treatment was mode of processing (perception and ima-
gery). The within-E._ treatments were type of pre- and post-exposure 
field (dark and light), visual presentation field (left and right), 
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and letter position in a stimulus word (one, two, three, and four). 
The dependent variable was response latency measured to one milli-
second. 
Apparatus 
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A two channel Scientific Prototype tachistoscope Model 800 E was 
used. The experimenter presented the stimulus for 150 msec. by throw-
ing a two way toggle switch. Throwing the toggle switch simultaneous-
ly started a Hunter Model 120 A Series D Klockounter (by opening a 
circuit in a Gerbrands Electronic Voice Key Model 130). The S's bi-
manual finger response was made by pushing two of four (central or 
peripheral) Electro-Snap Model E4-3 micro-switches located directly in 
front of the S. The response (measured by the one switch pressed 
first) stopped the clock by advancing one of two counters, the noise 
of which closed a circuit in a Lafayette 6602A Voice Response time 
control relay and thus closed the circuit in the Gerbrands voice key. 
Each set of micro-switches (central and peripheral) advanced separate 
counters. Thus, the two appropriately labeled counters indicated to! 
which response i had made and, hence, whether the response was correct 
or incorrect. The experiment required the use of two experimenters. 
!i gave instructions, presented the trials, recorded correct and in-
correct responses, recorded response latencies, and reset the Kloc-
kounter, and both voice relays after each trial. ! 2 changed the 
stimulus cards after each trial and changed the tachistoscope settings 
after each block of trials. This latter change consisted of setting 
the light intensity for the pre- and post-exposure field for the light 
53 
condition at the highest setting (and equal to the stimulus field) and 
for the dark condition at the lowest setting. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were eight high frequency four letter words (AA in 
the Thorndike and Lorge [1944] word count): blue, edge, half, page, 
show, spot, trip, and wild. Half of the total number of letters with-
in the set of eight words were vertically small (a, e, i, o, r, s, u, 
w, with some letters repeated) and half of the total number of letters 
were vertically large (b, d, f, g, h, 1, p, t, with some letters re-
peated) when printed as lowercase let.ters. In each of the four letter 
positions four letters were large and four were not large. The words 
were presented in blocks of eight (each word represented once). Within 
each block each letter position (one per word) occurred as the test 
letter twice, once as a large letter and once as a letter which was 
not large. Further, within each block each letter position appeared 
once in the LVF and once in the RVF. Four groupings (Table I) of 
the resulting four blocks (Figure 2) were determined in which each 
block appeared once in each presentation position (one through four). 
The order of presentation of these groupings was randomly chosen. Two 
such groupings made up the firs.t half of the trials and the other two 
made up the second half of the trials. The order of presentation of 
the words within each block was randomly chosen for each presentation 
of the block with the limitation that no more than three words in a 
row be presented from the same visual field. In each half of the 
trials, if a letter position and letter height appeared in the LVF in 
the first presentation of a block of eight words, they appeared in the 
TABLE I 
GROUPINGS OF THE FOUR BLOCKS OF STIMULUS WORDS 
First Half of 
Group 1 
1 
3 
4 
2 
Block 1 
Letter Position 
1 2 3 4 
e d g 
s 0 t 
t r p 
-..E... 
-- a e h 1 f 
h 0 w 
w i 1 
i v e 
Block 2 
Letter Position 
1 2 3 4 
d g e 
s p 0 
r i p 
p a g 
h a f 
s h w 
w 1 d 
b v e 
Trials 
Group 
Visual 
Field 
L 
R 
R 
L 
L 
R 
R 
L 
Visual 
Visual 
Field 
R 
L 
3 
1 
2 
4 
2 
Second Half of 
Group 3 
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RVF in the second presentation of the block and vice versa. There 
were a total of 128 trials. Half the 1's were randomly chosen to be-
gin with one set of 64 trials and half were chosen to begin with the 
other set of 64 trials. 
In the percept condition each word contained a bar marker over 
one of the letters (Figure 4). In the imagery task there was one let-
ter missing in each of the words and there was a bar marker over the 
space where the letter would normally have appeared (Figure 4). Thus, 
in this condition the S's had to use imagery in order to respond to 
the height of the missing letter. 
Percept Imagery 
I I 
/blue/ /bl e/ 
Figure 3. Examples of the Stimuli for the 
Percept and Imagery Conditions 
The letters were presented (within words) on four by five inch cards. 
The words were typed in lowercase pica letters on an IBM electric 
typewriter with carbon ribbon. The visual angle subtended by the 
words was 42 min. at a viewing distance of 33 inches (83 cm.). The 
words began 10 min. out from the midpoint of the visual field and the 
complete word was included in less than one degree of visual angle. 
Each letter subtended .10 minutes of viewing angle. Since Miskin and 
Forgays (1951) found recognition differences in the left and right 
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visual fields in a region between 1°11' and 4°46' from fixation, the 
distances were chosen to be within one degree of visual angle from the 
midpoint. 
When the S's looked through the viewing hood of the tachistoscope 
they saw a viewing field of approximately 2 1/2 by 2 3/4 inches for 
both the pre- and post-exposure fields and the stimulus field. In the 
dark pre- and post-exposure field the ~'s saw darkness which was 
created by placing dark construction paper in the auxiliary stimulus 
holders (preceding the light source). A small hole was made in the 
paper through which a pin point of light marking the midpoint was 
visible. The light source intensity was turned to its lowest setting 
for presentation of the dark pre- and post-exposure fields. 
In the light pre- and post-exposure field the light intensity was 
the same as that for the stimulus field (the highest setting). The 
S's saw a white ground with the midpoint marked by a black dot. The 
pre- and post-exposure fields alternated between dark and light for 
half the S's and between light and dark for the other half of the S's. 
The starting field (dark or light) was randomly selected for each S 
with the restraint that half of .the ~'s chosen to begin with a parti-
cular set of 64 trials began with the dark pre- and post-exposure 
fields and half began with the light pre- and post-exposure fields. 
Procedure 
The exact instructions given the S's are given in Appendix B. 
The S's were shown a card on which was typed, in lowercase letters, 
the alphabet. The were shown how the letters could be divided into 
two classes according to vertical height and were given practice in 
doing so. 
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Subjects were then shown two examples of marked words such as 
they would see in the test situation. They were told that their task 
would be to decide as quickly as they could whether. the letter which 
was indicated by the bar marker was large (a "yes" letter) or not 
large (a "no" letter). Subjects in the imagery condition were, in 
addition, told that since the actual letter would be missing, they 
would have to visually imagine the missing letter in order to make 
their decision concerning its height. These S's were told that visu-
ally imagining something is like picturing it in one's mind. 
The S's were then shown the midpoint of the viewing field. They 
saw both the dark condition (a pinpoint of light on a black background 
marking the midpoint) and the light condition (a black dot on a white 
background marking the midpoint). The S's were instructed to try to 
fixate on the dot before each word was shown. 
The S's were then given instruction in the bimanual response 
task. A bimanual task was used to prevent the biasing of one hemi-
sphere over the other. Half of the S's were told to press the outer 
two switches to indicate a large letter and the inner two switches to 
indicate a letter which was not large. The other half of the S's used 
the inner switches to indicate large letters and the outer switches to 
indicate letters which were not large. The two inner switches were 
pressed with the two index fingers and the outer two switches were 
pressed with the two middle fingers. The .e_'s were told to press with 
the corresponding fingers from both hands each time a response was 
made. 
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The S's were then shown two practice words and were given four 
practice trials. The practice trials gave the l's experience with 
left and right visual fields, "yes" and "no" responses, and dark and 
light pre- and post-exposure fields. No feedback was given as to the 
correctness or incorrectness of the l's responses. 
The l's were next given a list of the eight ~timulus words. 
After studying the list the l was given a written spelling test on the 
eight words. This served as a final check on handedness and also 
showed that the S's did indeed know how to spell the words (and thus, 
that they knew which letters would be used as the test letters). 
During the testing session the S viewed the pre-exposure field, 
~l said "set," and the word was presented to the S for 150 msec. The 
procedure is depicted in Figure 4. r'f a response was incorrect, this 
was noted and the trial was repeated at the end of the block. Hence, 
all response latencies were for correct responses only. After the ex-
periment, the S's were debriefed as to the nature of the experiment. 
Light or Dark 
Field with 
Fixation Point 
Word in LVF or RVF 
Light or Dark 
Field with 
Fixation Point 
Time 
(milliseconds) 
1€0 
0 
Figure 4. Outline of the Procedure 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
In order to reduce the effect of a few highly deviant response 
latencies on a subject's score, a logarithmic transformation was per-
formed on the latency data. This transformation converted each sub-
ject's individual score for each word and each condition into its 
corresponding logarithmic value. The geometric mean for the S's 
socre for each condition was then found and this value was converted 
again to milliseconds by taking the antilogarithm. In addition, all 
scores above 2500 milliseconds were deleted in calculating the mean~ 
This involved 32 of the total 3072 individual latencies. 
The results of the overall an.alysis of variance are summarized in 
Table II. A table of means and standard deviations for each condition 
is presented in Appendix C. The results show that for mode of proces-
sing, processing was faster for the percept condition than for the 
imagery condition (f (1,22) = 4.01, .E_ < .10), for pre- and post-expo-· 
sure fields, the dark condition interferred with processing (f (1,22) 
= 184.23, .E. < .0005), there was no difference between left and right 
visual fields (f (1,22) = 2.22, .E. > .10), and time to process the in-
formation was influenced by letter position(!:. (3,66) = 14.29, .E. < 
.0005). 
The finding that no statistical significance existed between left 
and right visual field presentations could have been the result of a 
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TABLE II 
SUMMA.RY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
OVERALL MEAN RESPONSE LATENCIES 
I 
Source Degrees of Freedom MS 
Between Subjects 
Mode of Processing (A) 
Subj. W. Groups 
Within Subjects 
I 
Pre- and Post-Exposure (B) 
Ax B 
B x Subj. W. Groups 
Visual Field (C) 
A x C 
C x Subj. W. Groups 
Letter Position (D) 
AxD 
D x Subj. W. Groups 
B x C 
Ax Bx C 
Bx C x Subj. W. Groups 
Bx D 
Ax Bx D 
B x D x Subj. W. Group's 
C x D 
A x C x D 
C x D x Subj. W. Groups 
B x C x D 
A x B x C x D 
Bx C x D x Subj. W. Groups 
* .E. < .10 
** .E. < .05 
*** .E. < .005 
**** p < .0005 
1 
22 
1 
1 
22 
1 
1 
22 
3 
3 
.66 
1 
1 
22 
3 
3 
66 
3 
3 
66 
3 
3 
66 
2.0700 
. 5157 
l. 7775 
.0296 
.0096 
.0106 
.0003 
.0047 
.1057 
.0181 
.0074 
.0001 
.0099 
.0050 
.0088 
.0038 
.0049 
.0189 
.0031 
.0038 
.0070 
.0041 
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F 
4.0138* 
184.2359**** 
3.0763* 
2.2232 
.0610 
14. 2977**** 
2.4488 
.0187 
1. 9777 
1. 7770 
• 7794 
4.9145*** 
.7946 
2.0692 
1. 7155 
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change in type of processing due to practice. For this reason, sepa-
rate analyses of variance were performed on the data from the first 
and second halves of the subjects' trials. A table of means for each 
condition in the first and second halves of the trials is presented in 
Appendix D. The results of the analysis of variance on the first half 
of the trials (Appendix E) revealed no difference in left and right 
visual field presentation (I (1,22) = .0318, E. > .25). The results of 
the analysis of variance on the second half of the trials (Appendix 
F), however, indicated a left visual field superiority (I (1,22) = 
3.958, .E. < .10). These results are depicted in Figure 5. 
In the overall analysis of the data significant interactions were 
found for mode of processing by pre- and post-exposure fields, (I (1, 
22) = 3.07, E. < .10), for mode of processing by letter position, (F 
(3,66) = 2.44, E. < .10), and for visual field by letter position (I 
(3,66) = 4.91, E. < .01). 
Simple effects tests (Appendix G) revealed significant differ-
ences between mode of processing in the dark and light pre- and post-
exposure fields. While the differences were not strong, Figure 6 
indicates that the imagery condition produced significantly longer 
response latencies than the percept condition under dark(£.< .OS) 
pre- and post-exposure fields. There is also a trend. toward the same 
longer latencies in the light (.E_ < .10) pre- and post-exposure fields. 
Further, Figure 6 indicates that the dark pre- and post-exposure 
fields produced longer response latencies for both perception(£.< 
.01) and imagery(£.< .01). 
Tests of simple main effects also revealed significant differ-
ences between mode of pr~cessing and three of the four letter 
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63 
--- ·- - - -- - - - - - - - First Half 
of Trials 
·-
Left 
Visual Field 
_. Overall 
Analysis 
Second Half 
of Trials 
Right 
Figure 5. Left and Right Visual Field Comparisons in Overall Analysis, 
First Half of the Trials and Second Half of the Trials 
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positions,. Thus, as Figure 7 depicts, perception produced signifi-
cantly faster response latencies for the first, third, and fourth let-
ter positions (each at the .05 level). As also depicted in Figure 7, 
the letter positions were significantly different from each other in 
both the perception (.E. < .001) and the imagery (.E. < .001) conditions. 
To examine this position effect more closely Newman-Keuls tests 
were performed. The results are indicated by the letters adjacent to 
each plotted position in Figure 7. Within the rang~ of each function, 
the letter positions having the same letter do not differ significant-
ly; however, the letter positions having different letters do differ 
significantly. The Newman-Keuls tests are presented in Appendix H. 
Thus, under the perception condition the response latencies for 
the third letter position are significantly higher than those for the 
first and fourth letter positions (each at .E. < .05), but not for those 
of the second letter position. Further, the sedond, first, and fourth 
letter positions do not differ significantly from one another. In the 
imagery condition the latencies for the third letter positions are 
significantly higher than the second (.E. < .01) and the first and 
fourth letter positions (each at .E. < .OS). Further analysis (Appendix 
G) revealed that in the first half of the .trials the third letter po-
sition was significantly higher than the fourth in the percept condi-
tion (.E. < .05). In the imagery condition it was significantly higher 
than all other letter positions(£.< .01 for the first and fourth 
positions, .E. < .05 for the second). In the second half of the trials, 
however, there were no significant differences-for latencies for the 
four letter positions in either perception or imagery conditions. 
Thus, the letter position was contained in the first half of the 
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trials and was produced by significantly higher response latencies in 
the third letter position. This effect was most pronounced in the 
imagery condition. These relationships are depicte':i in Figure 8. 
The simple main effects tests performed on the visual field by 
letter position interaction also revealed significant differences. 
Figure 9 indicates significantly longer response latencies for right 
visual field at the second (e. < .01) and the fourth(.£.< .OS) letter 
positions. Figure 9 also depicts a significant difference between 
letter positions with left visual field presentation(.£.< .01), and 
a slightly less significant difference with right visual field pre-
sentation(.£.< .OS). 
In order to more clearly specify the relationships between letter 
positions and left and right visual field presentations, Newman-Keuls 
tests were performed (Appendix G). The results indicate that in the 
overall data analysis left visual field presentation results in the 
third letter position producing significantly longer response laten-
cies than each of the other letter positions (.£. < .01 at each compari-
son), while the remaining three letter positions do not significantly 
differ from one another. The results also indicate no differences in 
letter positions for right visual field presentation. Further analy-
sis of the data (Appendix G) revealed that this result is produced by 
significantly higher response latencies for the third letter position 
in the left visual field presentation for the first half of the trials 
only. In the second half of the tri~ls there are no significant dif-
ferences between any of the letter positions in either the left or the 
right visual fields. These rest1lts are depicted in Figure 10. 
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In summary, the results suggest that for the present study, the 
subjects were able to perform the perception task in less time than 
the imagery task. The dark pre- and post-exposure field effectively 
disrupted both perception and imagery, although its effect on imagery 
was more pronounced. A letter position effect was produced by signi-
ficantly longer response latencies for the third letter position in 
the first half of the trials only. Finally, a difference in left and 
right hemispheric response latencies, while not occuring in the first 
half of the trials, did reveal a left visual field superiority for the 
second half of the trials. No S's in the imagery condition expressed 
any questions concerning th~ imagery task itself. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Discussion 
The overall finding that imagery processing produced longer re-
sponse latencies than did perceptual processing was, of course, not 
surprising. The imagery processing required more complex processing 
(the formation of the image) than the perceptual processing task (al-
though, as discussed below, other aspects of the two tasks may also 
have differed). Due probably to increased time needed for word recog-
nition/identification, the mean response latency for the imagery con-
dition was considerably longer (1.18 sec. for the overall analysis, 
1.24 sec. for the first half of the trials and 1.13 sec. for the sec-
ond half of the trials) than the processing times suggested by Weber 
and Castleman's (1970) study.· These researchers found that nearly 2 
letters could be processed per second. Weber and Bach (1969) similar-
ly found that nearly 2.5 letters could be processed per second. In 
the earlier studies, however, the subjects' task was to process the 
entire alphabet one letter at a time and in sequence. Mean time to 
process each letter was then calculated by dividing the total time by 
26. Weber, Kelly, and Little (1972) found that such sequencing be-
tween each letter is under verbal control. That is, in processing the 
sequential string of letters, i's name the individual next letter 
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before visualizing it and responding to its spatial characteristics. 
In the same study another experiment found that such an implicit ver-
bal control is not involved in the processing of visual representa-
tions of words. The study used four letter words (like the stimuli 
used in the present study) and found that it was evidently possible 
to have all four letters in the visual image equally available for 
processing the spatial characteristics. Weber and Harnish (1974) have 
also found this same equal availabiltiy of individual letters in words 
using a probe technique (requiring individual decisions on single let-
ters per trial) rather than sequential processing as the task. In-
deed, in very short words (3 letters), they found no differences in 
processing for imagery and perception. This suggests why the differ-
ences in the perceptual and imagery processing were not very great in 
the present study, Weber and Harnish's (1974) technique, however, 
probed for the single letter in the percept condition while the sub-
ject had the actual stimuli before him. In the imagery condition the 
probe called for information about a single letter taken from an ima-
gined visual representation of the word which had not been presented 
as a percept. In the present study, on the other hand, ~'sin the 
percept condition made their decisions based on visual iconic memory 
. . 
images of the stimuli rather the actual continuously present stimuli. 
Subjects in the imagery condition had the stimuli presented to them 
perceptually and had then to build the image of the missing letter. 
As will be discussed below, these two differences, as well as the very 
brief (tachistoscopic) presentation of stimuli used in the present ex-
periment, are important influences producing differences in the re-
• 
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results of the two studies in terms of processing times for imagining 
letters and making a decision concerning their spatial characteristics. 
In the present experiment the dark pre- and post-exposure fi.elds 
interrupted both the imagery and the perception tasks. Viewed in 
terms of the attempt to use the light and dark pre- and post-exposure 
fields as a mask for the imagery, this result is difficult to explain. 
Closer inspection of the results suggests possible processing patterns 
which do explain the finding, however. In masking with light the 
standard design uses a brief flash of light (TS) which is masked by a 
more intense flash of light of a larger area (MS) (Kahneman, 1968). 
Within this paradigm black figures on a white background have also 
been used, and it is well known that bright post-exposure fields lead 
to better masking (poorer visibility of the test stimulus) than dark 
post-exposure fields (Neisser, 1967). In the usual procedure, how-
ever, the intensity of the bright post-exposure field (MS) is more in-
tense than that of the test stimulus (TS). In the present study black 
letters on a white ground were used and in the light condition the 
pre- and post-exposure fields were the same intensity as the test sti-
mulus field. Direct comparisons to the masking literature are thus 
difficult to make. This limitation in the present study was necessary 
because only a two-channel tachistoscope-scope was available. 
Sperling (1960), in studying the information available in brief 
visual presentations did one experiment which combined dark and light 
post-exposure fields (pre-exposure field was always dark) and tachis-
toscopic presentation of printed alphabetic stimuli. In this experi-
ment the light post-exposure field was the same intensity as the 
stimulus field. His results showed that the light post-exposure field 
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greatly reduced the accuracy of both whole and partial reports of let-
ters within an array. Sperling concluded, "The ability of a homogene-
ous visual stimulus to affect the available information is evidence 
that the process depends on a persisting visual image of the stimulus 
(Sperling, 1960, p. 27). Thus, the light post-exposure field masked 
the visual image (iconic memory) of the array, while the dark post-
exposure field, in contrast, aided in its persistence. The icon can 
last up to 5 sec. in a dark post-exposure field, while it lasts less 
than half a second in a bright post-exposure field (Neisser, 1967). 
Future work might include replications of Sperling's work using 
imagery. Visually presenting letters and giving an auditory command 
(at different intervals after the visual presentations) to imagine 
another letter and report its height would show if the letters are 
interfering with the image formation. Presentation of just the audi-
tory command would help show that the disruption is or is not caused 
by the post-exposure fields themselves. 
Thus, the results o.f the present study suggest that it is these 
persisting visual images of the stimulus (enhanced by the dark post-
exposure field) which are interrupting the formation of the image of 
the missing letter in the imagery condition. A light post-exposure 
field might actually aid in the formation of the image by masking the 
disruptive images in the iconic memory. In both the perception and 
imagery conditions the persisting images seem to be interfering with 
spatial decision processes of the right hemisphere, much like the in-
terference between vision and imagery found by Brooks (1968) and Segal 
and Fusella (1970, 1971). Thus, in the imagery condition the longer 
response latencies may be due to a combination of masking effects and 
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interference. If this is the case, one would expect an interaction 
between mode of processing and pre- and post-exposure fields in which 
imagery would be more strongly disrupted (or delayed) than perception 
in the dark pre-- and post-exposure fields. While the interaction is 
present in the overall analysis, it appears even more strongly in the 
second half of the trials in which the subjects gave clearer evidence 
of successfully performing the imagery task without verbal interfer-
ence. In future work the analysis of error data would also lend evi-
dence to this point if more errors were made under conditions of dark 
pre- and post-exposure fields than under light in the imagery condi-
tion. 
The suggestion is that in the percept condition it could be that 
both peripheral and central masking are occuring. Turvey (1973) pro-
duced a peripheral masking situation by directing both test stimulus 
and masking stimulus to the same hemiretina, and he produced central 
masking by directing the TS and the MS through different hemiretina to 
the same hemisphere. Both situations could have occurred in the pres-
ent study. While it is difficult to make exact comparisons between 
the present experiment and Turvey's (1973) work (he used patterned 
masks in all of his experiments and, as mentioned above, he controlled 
for peripheral and central masking conditions with monoptic and di-
choptic presentation of the TS and MS), some possible correlates and 
implications of his work.for the present study can be drawn. He sug-
gests, for example, that 
when two stimuli compete for the services of peripheral 
systems, the greater energy event wins; on the other hand, 
when two stimuli compete for the services of the central 
decision process, the victor is likely to be the one that 
arrives second (Turvey, 1973, p. 39). 
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In Experiment XIX, Turvey (1973) tested the hypotheses that the 
situation in which target energy (stimulus field in the present study) 
was greater than the mask energy (black post-exposure field in the 
present study). He suggested that a very brief stimulus onset asyn-
chrony (O sec. in the present study) mask would fail to mask the tar-
get. In the case where the target intensity was less than the mask 
(possibly the light post-exposure field in the present experiment) the 
mask would mask the target. At this point any masking would be of a 
I 
peripheral nature. With delayed stimulus onset asynchrony, however, 
masking switches to a central process in which both situations produce 
masking as the second stimulus (the MS or the post-exposure field in 
the present experiment) arrives later at the central processor. Thus, 
at one point the two functions cross as masking switches from being 
peripheral to central. In the case of the target .energy being strong-
er than mask energy the central masking would not take place until 
stimulus onset asynchrony became so great that no masking occurred 
(the result would be a nonmonotonic U-shaped function usually found 
only in metacontrast situations in which TS and MS do not spatially 
overlap). In the case where the target energy is weaker than the 
mask energy, the masking effect would be great at short stimulus onset 
asynchrony, and would become less so with greater stimulus onset asyn-
chrony time periods. At one point both cases (TS< MS and TS> MS) 
would have the same masking effects. Then as the stimulus onset asyn-
chrony became longer and longer, masking would become weaker and 
weaker in both cases until it no longer occurred. Turvey's experiment 
confirmed both hypotheses and the specific predictions. For Turvey's 
(1973) data (with 10 msec. exposures for both TS and MS) the two 
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functions approached each other in the stimulus onset asynchrony 
range of 48 to 72 msec. These figures are suggestive in conjunction 
with Gough's (1972) work on the events that transpire in one second of 
reading. According to his estimates, it takes at least 50 msec. and 
more likely nearly 100 msec. for an icon to develop, with a 150 msec. 
presentation the post-exposure field maskirtg stimulus arrives within 
the next 50 msec. From the icon, letters are identified and read out 
starting from the time the icon is formed and at the rate of 10 to 20 
msec. per letter. Using these approximations it is suggested that in 
the present study the perception condition leads to central masking in 
both the light and dark pre- and post-exposure field conditions. 
Masking is not complete, however, because readout of the letters has 
already begun. Longer response latencies in the dark condition were 
caused by visual interference from the persisting visual images which 
were not masked. 
The letter position effect was caused entirely by the very long 
response latency of the third letter position. Furthermore, this 
finding of longer latencies as a significant effect was confined to 
the first ha!'f of the trials. Since this finding was unexpec-
ted, the stimuli presentation blocks were checked for possible bias 
toward early placement of the third letter position within the blocks. 
Four blocks of eight stimulus words were presented twice for the first 
and second halves of the trials. The order of the words was randomly 
selected for each of the eight blocks. Inspection showed, however, 
that in one half of the trials (first or second depending upon the 
subject) the third letter position is the test letter in the first 
word. in three of the eight blocks (and it is the test letter in the 
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second word in the block in a fourth block). In the other half of the 
trials, however, the bias is even stronger as the third letter posi-
tion is the test letter in the first word in five of the eight blocks 
' (and it is the test letter in the second word in the block in two 
other blocks, as well as being the test letter. in the second word in 
one block in which it also appears as the test letter in the first 
word). It would seem that the third letter position effect is created 
mainly by the early placement of the letter position within the stimu-
li blocks (and thus within the change to dark or light pre- and post-
exposure fields). The effect was reduced with practice, however. 
There was no significant letter position effect in the second half of 
the trials. 
Interactions between letter position and mode of processing and 
between letter position and visual presentation field, while they did 
I 
appear in the overall analysis, were shown to be confined to the first 
half of the trials. Further, they were shown to be due mainly to a 
three way interaction which produced significantly higher response 
latencies in the third letter position in the imagery condition with 
left visual field presentation. 
The interaction between letter position and mode of processing in 
which the imagery condition resulted in the highest response latency 
for the third letter position may have been contributed to by a phe-
nomenon reported by Horowitz, White and Atwood (1968b). These re-
searchers looked at the differences caused by different letter 
positio1s of the missing letters of the words. Their technique, how-
ever, w;1s to use different word fragments to elicit the whole word. 
They pr=sented fragments from the beginning, middle and end of words 
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to.which the subjects had been previously exposed and asked them to 
recall the words. The middle fragment elicited the correct response 
least readily and with the longest latency. The beginning fragment 
gave the best cue for the word and the end fragment was better than 
the middle. Furthermore, the advantage of the beginning fragment over 
the end fra1ment was larger than that of the end fragment over the 
middle fragment. Thus, in the perception and imagery conditions, the 
third letter of the word may have produced longer response times due 
to there being less information in the fragment. 
A letter position and visual field of presentation interaction 
may have been caused by a left visual field disadvantage. Fudin 
(1969, 1970) found there is a right visual field advantage for hori-
zontal nonsense arrays tachistoscopically presented from the right and 
left visual fields successively (i.e., to one field at a time). In 
monoptic presentation of pattern arrays Fudin (1970) found that the 
nasal hemiretina has sharper acuity. Thus, when a word is presented 
in the right hemisphere, its most important section (i.e., its most 
informative fragment) is perceived more accurately. In left visual 
field presentation the effect of the nasal hemiretina is similar to 
that of the right visual field presentation. In this case, however, 
the most accurately perceived section of the word is not the most in-
formative one. In the imagery condition when the third letter is 
missing there is very little information about the word available. 
Harcum and Dyer (1962) using a ten dot pattern presented simultaneous-
ly to left and right visual fields found that the ends of the pattern 
were perceived more accurately than the center sections of the pat-
tern. Thus, since the left visual field presentation of stimuli in 
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the imagery condition with the third letter positi6n letter missing 
contnlns little information as to the word and is perceived better 
than tlic• more informative section of the word, there is the possibili.-
ty ror 1•xtn~m<.·ly higll n·sJHinst>. l,1tency scores for the third lett<ir 
pos Lt i.011 • 
'l'lw overall analysis of the data did not reveal the hemispheric 
differences expected if the subjects had been engaging in an imagery 
(spatial) task. The results were found in the second half of the 
Lr1a1s, however. Even in this case the difference between the hemi-
spheric proces.:;;ing times (taken to indicate the corpus callosum trans-
fer t.ime) was only 20 msec. as compared with the normal finding of 30 
to 40 msec. Several problems with methodology in the present experi-
llll'l1t may have contributed to this lack of hemispheric specificity. 
F:lrsl, In the present experiment the subjects were shown the stimuli 
word with the missing letter in the imagery condition. According to 
llorowjtz, Day, Light, and White (1968a) the word may have been ver-
hnlly processed; then the missing letter would have been developed as 
an image and its spatial characteristic examined. These reseachers 
presented i's with cards containing words with a missing letter. The 
.§_'s had either to say the words or to say the missing letter. The S's 
were faster when they said the words. 
Apparently the stimuli card elicited whole words 
rather than single letters. A single letter can certainly 
be said faster and there are fewer alternatives to choose 
from, but still the whole word seems to come to mind first. 
When the subject has to supply a letter he apparently 
thinks of the word first and then selects the appropriate 
letter out of it (Horowitz et al., 1968a, p. 72). 
Horowitz et al. (1968a) conducted a related experiment in the 
same study. In this experiment one group of subjects learned nonsense 
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words in a paired associates task to a criterion of one perfect trial. 
A second group learned the same words in the PA task to a criterion of 
three perfect trials. When asked to say the nonsense words or to say 
the missing letter when presented cards as in the first experiment, 
the s~~cond group was much faster at saying the words than at saying 
the missing letter. The first group was about equal on both tasks. 
Horowitz et a.I.. ( 1968a) concluded that as a word grows more familiar 
it becomes more available. As a word becomes more available, it 
dt~velops the properties of a good gestalt. Thus, a fragment coines to 
elicit the whole word rather than the missing part. 
This sequence of events would lead to a right visual field ad-
vantage, but such an advantage was not found. The 150 msec. presen-
tatl.on period was used in the present study to ensure recognition of 
the word, but eye movements can occur at this rate and if they did oc-
cur could have confounded any visual field superiority. Another prob-
lem ls limited to the dark presentation field. In this condition, a 
white pinpoint of light was used for the fixation point in the pre-
and post-exposure fields. Due to the time neces$ary to change the 
stimuli curds in the tachistoscope there is sufficient time for the 
autokinet:i.c effect to emerge. After the ninth subject spontaneously 
reported the effect, all subjects were questioned as to whether they 
had experienced the ef feet. All but tJwo of the subjects so questioned 
reported the effect. Although there is some controversy as to whether 
the effect is caused by eye movement (Spigel, 1965), the effect may 
have confounded the results in this condition. Finally, the use of 
the bar marker to indicate the letter to be processed in the percept 
condition may have acted as a mask for that letter. In future 
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research the use of shorter presentation times, a three channel tach-
istoscope in which the fixation point can be presented for a short 
period before the stimulus presentation and the use of tonal markers 
after the presentation might produce cleaner results. 
Further research in this area: is obviously warranted. Certainly 
Turvey's (1973) work in central and peripheral masking suggests re-
plication studies using imagery rather than perceptual stimuli. The 
greater the understanding of the areas of central and peripheral 
masking and hemispheric specialization, the more tools there will be 
available to study the nature of imagery. 
Finally, while the imagery was effectively disrupted in the pres-
ent study, more research is needed to more clearly define the effect. 
Erdalyi (1974) suggests that we do not know exactly where perception 
takes place in the central processing mechanism. Perception is en-
coded into long-term memory, however. If as Seamon and Gazzaniga 
(1972) suggest, the encoding can be either of a verbal or a visual 
nature, the key to the controversy may lie here. Thus, when encoding 
is done in a visual (spatial) manner, imagery may be very much like 
"perception." When encoding is done in a verbal manner, however, ima-
gery may be very little like "perception." 
Summary 
The purpose of the present study was to study the nature of 
imagery. Specifically, it was hoped that the experiment would contri-
bute to the investigation of the question regarding imagery's simi-
larity to perception. It was,reasoned that if imagery and perception 
are similar in nature, then variables which affect perception ought to 
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affect imagery similarly. One such variable is the eyeblink. In per-
ception the eyeblink can shut off incoming information, facilitate 
changes in focus and fixation, and provide added processing time for 
information (as blinks of technique in reading). Aspects of blinking 
also suggest correlates with the masking literature. It was suggested 
that in imagery, the blink might serve to mask or erase imagery. Work 
by Holland and,Tarlow (1972) indicates that mental load affects blink 
rate. Indeed, they suggest that blinks might disrupt certain cogni-
tive processes. It is suggested that visual imagery processing is one 
such cognitive process. In order to get a cleaner measure of imagery 
processing, the split-brain paradigm with normal subjects was used in 
the present experiment. 
Tachistoscopic presentation of four letter words in conditions of 
dark and light pre- and post-exposure fields was used. Pr.esentation 
was from the left or right visual presentation field. Subjects in the 
percept condition were presented the entire word with a bar marker 
over one of the letters. They were instructed to respond to the ver-
tical height of the marked letter. Subjects in the imagery condition 
received the same words with one of the letters missing, and with a 
bar marker over the space where the letter would normally have ap-
peared. They were instructed to imagine and respond to the vertical 
height of the missing letter. A bimanual response was used in order 
not to bias either hemisphere. 
The results showed that the dark and light pre- and post-exposure 
fields did disrupt processing in the imagery and the perception condi-
tions. It is sugges~ed, however, that for perception the disruption 
was caused by masking in the light condition and by a combination of 
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masking and visual interference with the spatial decision process in 
the dark condition. For imagery, the masking of the percept in the 
light condition may have aided image formation, while persistance of 
the percepts in the dark condition may have hindered image formation 
as well as caused visual interference with the spatial decision once 
the image was formed. Hemispheric specialization effects while pres-
ent were not strong and emerged only with practice. Methodological 
problems were suggested as reasons for this finding and suggestions 
were made for improvement in future research. 
As a beginning step in the study of the possible masking effects 
on imagery, the present experiment is most valuable in pointing out 
areas for further research. Methodological problems make definitive 
conclusions on the basis of the present work impossible. Suggested 
future research in the areas outlined are expected to contribute to 
the knowledge of the nature of imagery. 
REFERENCES 
Antrobus, J., Antrobus, Judith, & Singer, J, Eye movements accompa-
nying daydreaming, visual imagery, and thought suppression. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 244-252. 
Barron, V. Blink rate as a function of cognitive complexity and emo-
tional arousal. Unpublished master's thesis, Oklahoma State 
University, 1973. 
Baumstimler, Y., & Parrot, J. Stimulus generalization and 
ous blinking in man involved in a voluntary activity. 
of Experimental Psychology, 1971, 88, 95-102. 
spontane-
Journal 
Blount, W. P. Studies on the movements of the eyelids of animals. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Physiology, 1928, 18, 111. 
Cited by A. Hall, The origin and purposes of blinking, British 
Journal of Opthalmology, 1945, 29, 445-467. 
Bower, G. Analysis of a mnemonic device. American Scientist, 1970, 
58, 496-510. 
Broadbent, D. E. Perception~ conununication. New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1958. 
Brooks, L. The suppression of visualization by reading. The Quarter-
1.Y: Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1967, 19, 289-299. 
Brooks, L. Spatial and verbal components of the act of recall. 
Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1968, ~' 349-368. 
Bugelski, B. R. The definition of the image. 
Imagery: Current cognitive approaches. 
Press , 1971. 
In S. J. Segal (Ed.), 
New York: Academic 
Collins, W. E. Effects of mental set upon vestibular nys.tagmus. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1962, 63, 191-197. 
Cooper, L.A. & Shepard, R. N. Chronometric studies of the rotation 
of mental images. Paper presented at the symposium on visual 
information processing, Carnegie-Mellon University, May, 1972. 
Dimond, S. J., Gibson, A. R., & Gazzaniga, M. S. Cross field and 
within field integration of visual information. Neuropsycholo-
gia, 1972, 10, 379-381. 
86 
Downs, R. M., & Stea, D. (Eds.) Image and environment: Cognitive 
mapping and spatial behavior. Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 
1973. 
English, H.B., & English, A. C. ! comprehensive dictionary of~-
chological and psychoanalytical terms. New York: McKay, 1958. 
Erdalyi, M. H. 
vigilance. 
A new look at the new look: Perceptual defense and 
Psychological Review, 1974, 81, 1-25. 
Filbey, R. A., & Gazzaniga, M. S. Splitting the normal brain with 
reaction time. Psychonomic Science, 1969, 17, 335-336. 
Fudin, R. Recognition of alphabetical arrays presented in the right 
and left visual fields. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1969, ~' 
15-22. 
Fudin, R. Letter structure factors in the recognition of alphabeti-
cal arrays presented in the right and left visual fields. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, '1970, 31, 555-557. 
Galton, F. Statistics of 'mental imagery. Mind, 1880, 2_, 301-318. 
Gazzaniga, M. S. The bisected brain. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1970. 
Geffen, G., Bradshaw, J., & Nettleson, N. C. Hemispheric asymmetry: 
Verbal and spatial encoding of visual stimuli. Journal of Ex-
Experimental Psychology, 1972, 95, 25-31. 
Geffen, G., Bradshaw, J., & Wallace, G, Interhemispheric effects on 
reaction time to verbal and nonverbal visual stimuli. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 1971, ~' 415-422. 
Gibson, A. R., Dimond, S. J., & Gazzaniga, M. S. Left field superi-
ority for word matching. Neuropsychologia, 1972, 10, 463-466. 
Gibson, A., Filbey, R. A., & Gazzaniga, M. S. Hemispheric differ-
ences as reflected by reaction time. Federation Proceedings, 
1970, 29, 658. (Abstract) 
Gough, P. B. One second of reading. Visible Language, 1972, .§_, 
291-320. 
Hall, A. The origin and purposes of blinking. British Journal of 
Opthalmology, 1945, 29, 445-467. 
Hall, C. S., & Lindzey, G. Theories of personality. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1970. 
Harcum, E. R., & Dyer, D. W. Monocular and binocular reproduction 
of binary stimuli appearing right and left of fixation. Amer-
ican Journal of Psychology, 1962, 75, 56-65. --
87 
Harnish, R. W. Hemispheric specialization and imagery processing. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis, Oklahoma State University, 1974. 
Hebb, D. A textbook of psychology. Philadelphia: Saunders, 1966. 
Hebb, D. O. Concerning imagery. Psychological Review, 1968, J.1.., 
466-477. 
Hebb, D. o. What psychology is about. American Psychologist, 1974, 
29, 71-79. 
88 
Holland, M. K., & Tarlow, G. Blinking and mental load. Psychological 
Reports, 1972, 31, 119-127. 
Horowitz, L. M., Day, R. S., Light, L. L., & White, M.A. Availabil-
ity growth and latent verbal learning. Journal .2!. General Psy-
chology, 1968a, 78, 65-83. 
Horowitz, L. M., White, M.A., & Atwood, D. W. Word fragments as aids 
to recall: The organization of a word. Journal .2!. Experimental 
Psychology, 1968b, J.!!.., 219-226. 
Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. Receptive fields and functional archi-
tecture in two nonstriate visual areas (18 and 19) of the cat. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 1965, 28, 229-289. 
Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. Receptive fields of neurons in the 
cat's striate cortex. Journal of Physiology, 1959, 148, 574-
591. 
Jacobs, A. Mood - emotion - affect: The nature of and manipulation 
of affective states with particular reference to positive affec-
tive states and emotional illness. In A. Jacobs and L.B. Sachs, 
The psychology of private events. New York: Academic Press, 
1971. 
Jacobs, A., & Wolpin, M. A second look at systematic desensitization. 
In A. Jacobs and L. R. Sachs, The psychology £f private events. 
New York: Academic Press, 1971. 
Kahneman, D. Method, findings, and theory in studies of visual mask-
ing. Psychological Bulletin, 1968, 70, 404-425. 
Kirk, R. E. 
ences. 
Kimura, D. 
tion. 
Experimental design: 
Belmont, California: 
Procedures for the behavioral sci-
Brooks/Cole-;-1"968. 
Dual functional asymmetry of the brain in visual percep-
Neuropsychologia, 1966, !, 275-285. 
Kimura, D. Spatial localization in left and right visual fields. 
Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1969, 23, 445-458. 
Kinsbourne, M. The cerebral basis of lateral asynunetrics in atten-
tion. ~ Psychologia, 1970, 33, 193-201. 
Klatzky, R. I. Interhemispheric transfer of test stimulus represen-
tations in memory scanning. Psychonomic Science, 1970, 21, 201-
203. 
Klinger, E. Development of imaginative behavior: Implications of 
play for a theory of fantasy. Psychological Bulletin, 1969, 72, 
277-298. 
Levy, J. Possible evolutional basis of lateral specialization. 
Nature, 1969, 224, 614-615. 
Levy-Agresti, J., & Sperry, R. W. Differential perceptual capacities 
in major and minor hemispheres. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 1968, 61, 1151. (Abstract) 
Mar.ascuilo, L.A. Statistical methods for behavioral science re-
search. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. 
McKeever, S. F., & Gill, K. M. Visual half-field differences in 
masking effects for sequential letter stimuli in the right and 
left handed. Neuropsychologia, 1972, 10, 111-117. 
89 
Milner, G., Branch, C., & Rasmussen, T. Observations on cerebral dom-
inance. In R. C. Oldfield and J.C. Marshall (Eds.), Language. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Education, 1973. 
Mishkin, M., & Forgays, D. G. Word recognition as a function of 
retinal locus. Journal of Experimental Psychoiogy, 1952, 43, 
43-48. 
Moscovitch, M. Choice reaction-time study assessing the verbal be-
havior of the minor hemisphere in normal adult humans. Journal 
of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1972, 80, 66-74. 
Neisser, U. Cognitive psychology. New York: Meredith, 1967. 
Neisser, U. Visual imagery as process and experience. In J. Antro-
bus (Ed.), Cognition and affect. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. 
Norman, D. Memory and attention: 
tion processing. New York: 
An introduction to human informa-
John Wiley, 1969. 
Paivio, A. Imagery and verbal processes. New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1971. 
Paivio, A., & Ernest, c. H. Imagery ability and visual perception of 
verbal and nonverbal stimuli. Perception and Psychophysics, 
1971, 10, 429-432. 
Perky, C. W. An experimental study of imagination. American Journal 
of Psychology, 1910, 21, 422-452. Cited by S. J, Segal and 
90 
P. Gordon, The Perky effect revisited: Blocking of visual signals 
by imagery, Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1969, 28, 796-797. 
Peterson, J., & Allison, L. W. Controls of the eye-wink mechanism. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1931, 14, 144-154. 
Ponder, E., & Kennedy, W. E. On the act of blinking. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Physiology, 1927, 18, 89-110. 
Pylyshyn, Z, W. What the mind's eye tells the mind'.s brain: A 
critique of mental imagery. Psychological Bulletin, 1973, 
80, 1-24. 
Raab, D. H. Backward masking. Psychological Bulletin, 1963, 60, 
118...:129. 
Rizzolatti, G., Umilta, C. A., & Berlucchi, G. Opposite superiorities 
of the right and left cerebral hemispheres in discriminate re-
action time to physiognomical and alphabetical material. Brain, 
1971, 94, 431-442. 
Satz, P., Achenbach, K., & Fennell, E. Correlations between assessed 
manual laterality and predicted speech laterality in a normal 
population. Neuropsychologia, 1967, l, 295-310. 
Seamon. J, G., & Gazzaniga, M. S. Coding strategies and cerebral 
laterality effects. Cognitive Psychology, 1973, l, 249-256. 
Segal, S. J, Processing of the stimulus in imagery and perception. 
In S. J, Segal (Ed.), Imagery: Current cognitive approaches. 
New York: Academic Press, 1971. 
Segal, S. J., & Fusella, V, Effect of images in six sense modalities 
on detection (d') of visual signal from noise. Psychonomk Sci-
~' 1971, 24, 55-56. 
Segal, S. J., & Glicksman, M. Relaxation and the Perky effect: The 
influence of body position on judgments of imagery. American 
Journal of Psychology, 1967, 80, 257-262. 
Segal, S. J., & Gordon, P. The Perky effect revisited: Blocking of 
visual signals by imagery. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1969, 
28, 791-797. 
Shepard, R. N., & Chipman, S. Second-order isomorphism of internal 
representations: Shapes of states. Cognitive Psychology, 1970, 
.!., 1-17. 
Shepard, R. N., & Feng, C. A chronometric study of mental paper 
folding, Cognitive Psychology, 1972, ]., 228-243. 
Sperling, G. 
tions. 
The information available in brief visual presenta-
Psychological Monographs, 1960, 74, No. 11. 
Sperry, R. W. The great cerebral cornmissure. In Psychobiology: 
The biological bases of behavior, San Francisco: W. H. Free-
man, 1967. (Originally published: Scientific American, 1964, 
210, 42-52.) 
91 
Sperry, R. W. Hemispheric deconnection and unity in conscious aware-
ness. American Psychologist, 1968, 23, 723~733. 
Spigel, I. M. Problems in the study of visually perceived movement: 
An introduction. In R, N. Haber (Ed.), Contemporary theory and 
research in visual perception. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1968. (Originally published: Re:adings in the study 
of visually perceived movement by I. M. Spigel. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1965.) 
Telford, C. W., & Thompson, N. Some factors influencing voluntary 
and reflex eyelid responses. Journal_£!_ Experimental Psycholo-
_gy_, 1932, 16, 534-539. 
Thompson, R. F. Foundations of physiological psychology. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1967. 
Thorndike, E. L., & Lorge, I. The teacher's word book_£!_ 30,000 
words. New York: Teacher's College, Columbia University, 
1944. 
Turvey, M. T. On peripheral and central processes in vision: In-
ferences from an information-processing analysis of masking 
with patterned stimuli. Psychological Review, 1973, 80, 1-52. 
Vetter, H.J., & Smith, B. D. (Eds.) Personality theory: A source 
book. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971. 
Watson, R. I. The great psychologists. New York: J, B. Lippin-
cott, 1971. 
Weber, R., & Bach, M. Visual and speech imagery. British Journal 
of Psychology, 1969, 60, 199-202. 
Weber, R., & Castleman, J. The time it takes to imagine. Percep-
tion and Psychophysics, 1970, ~, 165-168. 
Weber, R., & Harnish, R. Visual imagery for words: The Hebb test. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 98, 26-31. 
Weber, R., & Kelly, J, Aspects of visual and acoustic imagery. 
Psychonomic Science, 1972, 27, 121-122. 
Weber, R., Kelly, J., & Little, S. Is visual image sequencing under 
verbal control? Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1972, 96, 
354-362. 
Weitzenhoffer, A. M. Eyeblink rate and hypnosis: Preliminary find-
ings. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1969, 28, 671-676. 
White, M. ·J. Visual hemifield differences in perception: A review. 
Psychological Bulletin, 1969, J.l:.., 387-405. 
White, M. J. Visual hemifield differences in the perception of let-
ters and contour orientation. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 
1971, 25, 206-211. 
Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. 
92 
APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A 
HANDEDNESS QUESTIONNAIRE 
94 
Handedness Questionnaire 
Name Phone 
I. Which hand do you use to perform each of the following activi-
ties? (Check the appropriate answer.) 
95 
Right Hand Left Hand Either Hand 
1. Write 
2. Throw a ball 
3. Hammer 
4. Pull back a bow string and arrow 
s. Use a racket (e.g.' tennis, ping 
pong, etc.) 
6. Hold a match while striking it 
7. Use a toothbrush 
8. Hold the thread when threading a 
needle 
u Use a table knife ~ . 
10. Use a spoon 
11. Hold a glass when drinking from 
it 
II. Were any of the following relatives left-handed? (Check the ap-
propriate answer.) 
Yes No Don't know or Not applicable 
1. Mother 
2. Father 
3. Sisters 
4. Brothers 
s. Grandmothers 
6. Grandfathers 
III. Do you wear glasses? Contact lenses? 
• 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONS 
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The following instructions were read to each l after he was 
seated in front of the viewing hood of the tachistoscope. The in-
structions given here are for the perception condition. When differ-
ent from the perception condition, the instructions for the imagery 
condition are given within brackets immediately following those for 
the perception condition. 
I am interested in finding out how fast people can process infor-
mation. In particular I want to. find out how fast you can make a de-
cision about letters of the alphabet. 
When we look at lowercase typed letters like these (!1 presents S 
with a card containing the alphabet typed in lowercase letters), we 
see that they can be divided into two classes according to height. 
Thus, the letters are either large or not large. If a letter is 
large, let's label it "yes" and if it is not large, let's label it 
"no." For example ... (E points to appropriate example letters in 
the list and labels them. - Included are "problem" letters "i," "j" 
and "t.") Now I'm going to point to each letter and I want you to say 
"yes" or "no" according to whether the letter is large or not large. 
A large letter is "yes" and a letter which is not large is "no." (_§ 1 
points to successive letters in the list and S labels them "yes" or 
"no." If l makes mistakes, ! 1 corrects him.) 
After you familiarize yourself with a list of eight words, I am 
going to show you one word at a time in this apparatus. Each word 
will have four letters and will appear very briefly. In each of the 
words there will be a bar marker over one of the letters. It will 
look like this. [In each of the words there will be a letter missing. 
The space where the letter should be will have a bar marker over it 
like this.] (]i1 shows l an example printed on a card.) Your task 
will be to decide as quickly as you can whether the letter which is 
indicated by the bar marker is large (that is, a "yes" letter) or not 
large (that is, a "no" letter) as we discussed already. Do you have 
any questions so far? [Your task will be to decide as quickly as you 
can whether the missing letter is large (that is, a "yes" letter) or 
not large (that is, a "no" letter) as we discussed already. Since the 
actual letter will be missing, you will have to visually imagine the 
missing letter in order to make your decision concerning its height. 
Imagining something visually is like picturing it in your mind. Do 
you have any questions so far? (!1 makes a note if any S's express 
questions about the imagery task.)] 
If you look through this viewer with both eyes, you will some-
times see a black dot on a white ground, like this. (l looks through 
viewer. ]i2 adjusts the tachistoscope settings.) At other times you 
will see blackness with a white dot of light like this. (S looks 
through viewer.) Try to fixate on this dot before each word is shown. 
The dot marks the midpoint'in the viewing field. The words will 
appear on either side of the midpoint (sometimes on the left, some-
times on the right), so that fixating on the dot will help you to get 
the most letters consistently correct. 
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If you decide that the marked [missing] letter is large, I want 
you to press these two outer (inner) switches with your two middle 
(index) fingers, like this. (!demonstrates.)· If the marked [missing] 
letter is not large, then press these two inner (outer) switches with 
your two index (middle) fingers, like this. (!1 demonstrates.) Now 
you try it. Press the switches to indicate a "yes" letter. (S 
presses the switches.) Press the switches to indicate a "no" letter. 
(~ presses the switches.) 
Let's practice with these two words. (!1 shows~ two practice 
words typed in lowercase lette.rs on a card. The words appear within 
brackets.) Familiarize yourself with these words while we set up the 
apparatus. (E2 adjusts the tachistoscope settings.) Now let's try a 
few practice trials. When you look through the viewer, fixate on the 
midpoint. I will say "set" and the word will be presented to you. 
You must then visually imagine the missing letter and decide whether 
it is large or not large. Try to respond as quickly as possible while 
striving for 100% accuracy. Remember to use your two middle (index) 
fingers to indicate a large letter and your two index (middle) fingers 
to indicate a letter which is not large. Press with the corresponding 
fingers from both hands each time you make a response. Any questions? 
Now put your fingers in position, look into the viewer and we will be-
gin. (§. is given 4 practice trials. The practice trials give the~ 
experience with left and right visual fields, "yes" and "no" re-
·sponses, and dark and light masks. Sis not told whether or not his 
responses are correct or incorrect.) 
Now I'd like you to familiarize yourself with these eight words. 
In a minute I'm going to give you a spelling test on them. (!1 gives 
~ a card with the eight stimulus words typed in lowercase letters 
within brackets. ~ studies the list while ! 2 adjusts the tachisto-
scope settings and readies the stimulus cards.) Now I'd like you to 
take a short spelling test on the words. (E 1 takes the card with the 
8 words from the~ and gives~ a small piece of paper with 8 numbered 
lines on it and a pencil.) As I say the word, just write it out on 
this paper. Please print. (!1 says each word in order from the card. 
~ writes out each word. ! 1 watches and knows ~'s score by the time 
he is done.) That's perfect. 
Remember, when you look through the viewer, try to fixate on the 
midpoint. I will say "set" and theword will be presented to you. 
You must then decide as quickly as you can whether the letter which is 
indicated by the bar marker is large or not large. [You must then 
visually imagine the missing letter and decide whether it is large or 
not large.] Try to respond as quickly as possible while striving for 
100% accuracy. Remember to use your two index (middle) fingers to 
indicate a large letter and your two middle (index) fingers to indi-
cate a letter which is not large. Press with the corresponding fin-
gers from both hands each time you make a· response. Any questions? 
O.K. If you'll get ready,, then we'll get started. I know there is no 
room for your knees, so if you get cramped just let us know and we'll 
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rest for a short while. (Sis given 64 trials.) O.K. We're half-way 
done. You may stretch for-a minute if you'd like, while we get ready 
for the second half. Are you all ready? (~ is given 64 trials.) 
APPENDIX C 
TABLE OF MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
EACH CONDITION OF OVERALL ANALYSIS 
100 
Mode of Pre- and Post- Visual Letter 
Processing Exposure Field Field Position 
1 
Left 2 3 
Dark 4 1 
Right 2 3 
4 
Percept 
1 
Left 2 3 
Light 4 1 
Right 2 3 
4 
1 
Left 2 3 
Dark 4 1 
Right 2 3 
4 
Imagery 
1 
Left 2 3 
Light 4 1 
Right 2 3 
4 
Mean 
1. 0601 
1.0945 
1.1283 
1. 0614 
1. 06 78 
1. 1281 
1. 1265 
1.0938 
.9678 
.9732 
1. 0415 
.9246 
• 9617 
.9884 
1.0171 
.9382 
1. 2812 
1.1906 
1.3231 
1.2408 
1. 1987 
1. 2492 
l. 3194 
1. 2728 
1.0837 
1.0569 
1. 1754 
1.0605 
1.1282 
1.1104 
1. 1357 
1. 0958 
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Standard 
Deviation 
.2262 
.1952 
.2293 
.1952 
• 2430 
.2229 
.2638 
.1894 
• 2119 
.2465 
.2327 
.1892 
.2251 
.2133 
.2505 
.1993 
.1820 
.1343 
.1770 
.1762 
. 1570 
.1418 
.1809 
.1692 
.1372 
.1402 
. 1585 
.1533 
.1103 
.1674 
.1900 
.1438 
APPENDIX D 
TABLE OF MEANS.FOR FIRST AND SECOND 
HALVES OF THE TRIALS 
102 
Mode of 
Processing 
Percept 
Imagery 
FIRST HALF OF THE TRIALS 
Pre- and Post-
Exposure Field 
Dark 
Light 
' 
Dark 
Light 
Visual 
Field 
Left 
Right 
Left 
Right 
Left 
Right 
Left 
Right 
Letter 
Position 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Mean 
1.1262 
1. 1144 
1. 2106 
1. 1289 
1.1397 
1.1858 
1. 2226 
1.1250 
1. 0071 
1. 0428 
1. 0931 
• 9688 
1. 0402 
1.0172 
1. 0607 
. 9515 
1.3445 
1. 2497 
1. 4628 
1.2490 
1. 2133 
1.3562 
1. 3896 
1. 2892 
1.1759 
1. 1006 
1. 2772 
1.1486 
1. 1742 
1. 1904 
1.1899 
1. 122 7 
Mode of 
Processing 
Percept 
Imagery 
SECOND HALF OF THE TRIALS 
Pre- and Post-
Exposure Field 
Dark 
Light 
I 
Dark 
Light 
Visual 
Field 
Left 
Right 
Left 
Right 
Left 
Right 
Left 
Right 
Letter 
Position 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Mean 
--··- ·- ··- --···--
1. 0058 
1.0799 
1. 0,55 7 
1.0030 
1.0084 
1.0784 
1.0543 
1.0664 
• 9298 
.9288 
.9999 
.8846 
.8971 
.9620 
.9832 
• 9230 
1. 2244 
1.1408 
1. 2122 
1. 2352 
1. 1937 
1. 1776 
1. 2591 
1. 2511 
1.0087 
1.0213 
1.0921 
.9825 
1.0885 
1.0435 
1.0931 
1.0761 
APPENDIX E 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR MEAN 
RESPONSE.LATENCIES IN FIRST HALF 
OF THE TRIALS 
105 
106 
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR MEAN 
RESPONSE TIMES IN FIRST HALF OF THE TRIALS 
Source 
Between Subjects 
Mode of Processing (A) 
Subj. W. Groups 
Within Subjects 
Pre- and Post-Exposure (B) 
Ax B 
Bx Subj. W~ Groups 
Visual Field (C) 
Ax C , 
C x Subj. W. Groups 
Letter Position (D) 
AxD 
D x Subj. W. Groups 
Bx C 
A x B x C 
Bx C x Subj. W. Groups 
B x D 
A x B x D 
Bx D x Subj. W. Groups 
C x D 
Ax C x D 
C x D x Subj. W. Groups 
B x C x D 
AxBxCxD 
Bx C x D x Subj. W. Groups 
* .E. < .10 
** .E. < .05 
*** .E. < • 01 
**** .E. < .0005 
Degrees of Freedom MS F 
1 
22 
1 
1 
22 
1 
1 
22 
3 
3 
66 
1 
1 
22 
3 
3 
66 
3 
3 
66 
3 
3 
66 
2.3425 
.6682 
3.5054* 
1.8925 99.5588**** 
.0040 .2086 
.0190 
. 0004 . 0318 
.0067 .5674 
.0118 
.2344 13.9608**** 
.0102 .6072 
.0168 
• 0039 . 4026 
.0105 1.0750 
.0098 
.0152 1.1034 
.0093 .6758 
.0138 
.0493 4.3782*** 
,0356 3.1626** 
.0113 
. 0211 1. 4096 
. 0076 • 5058 
.0150 
APPENDIX F 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR MEAN 
RESPONSE LATENCIES IN SECOND UALF 
OF THE TRIALS 
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SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR MEAN 
RESPONSE TIMES IN SECOND HALF 
OF THE TRIALS 
Source Degrees of Freedom MS 
Between Subjects 
Mode of Processing (A) 1 1. 8805 
Subj~ W. Groups 22 .4526 
Within Groups 
Pre- and Post-Exposure (B) 1 1.7043 
Ax B 1 .0741 
Bx Subj. W. Groups 22 . 0152 
Visual Field (C) 1 .0461 
A x C 1 .0122 
C x Subj. W. Groups 22 .0116 
Letter Position (D) 3 .0466 
Ax D 3 .0379 
D x Subj. W. Groups 66 .0088 
B x c 1 .0028 
Ax B x c 1 .0107 
B x c x Subj. W. Groups 22 • 0111 
B x D 3 .0198 
A x B x D 3 .0107 
B x D x Subj. w. Groups 66 . 0086 
C x D 3 .0117 
A x C x D 3 .0017 
C x D x Subj. w. Groups 66 .0073 
B x c x D 3 .0054 
Ax B x c x D 3 .0140 
B x c x D x Subj. w. Groups 66 .0087 
* .E. < .10 
** .E. < .05 
*** .E. < .01 
**** .E. < .005 
***** .E. < .00005 
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F 
4. 1552* 
I 
111. 7106***** 
4.8602** 
3.9581* 
1.0448 
5.2966**** 
4.3073*** 
.2546 
.9664 
2.2929* 
1.2408 
1. 5975 
• 2275 
. 6135 
1.6060 
APPENDIX G 
SIMPLE EFFECTS SUMMARY TABLE 
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110 
Source SS df MS F 
Bet. Subjects 
Bet. A at b1 1.298 1 1.298 4.9412* 
Bet. A at b2 • 802 1 .802 3.0530 
Error A at b. 11. 5583 44 .26269 
J 
Bet. A at dl .604 1 .604 4.4914* 
Bet. A at d2 .269 1 ,269 2.0003 
Bet. A at d3 .614 1 ,614 4.5657* 
Bet. A at d4 .638 1 .638 4.7442* 
Error A at d1 11. 8342 88 .13448 
Within Subjects 
Bet. Bat a 1 .675 1 .675 69.9622**** 
Bet. B at a2 1.134 1 1.134 117.5365**** 
Error Bat a. .02122 22 .009648 
]. 
Bet. D at a 1 .162 3 .054 7. 3011**** 
Bet. D at a2 .212 3 .071 9.5455**** 
Error Data. .48815 66 .007396 
]. 
Bet. c at dl .002 1 .002 .4902 
Bet. c at d2 .039 1 .039 9.5588*** 
Bet. c at d 3 .007 1 .007 1. 7157 
Bet. c at d4 .020 1 .020 4.9020* 
Error Cat d1 .35904 88 .00408 
Bet. D at c1 .273 3 .091 16 .1792'**** 
Bet. D at c2 .102 3 .034 6.0450** 
Error D at ck .589434 132 .0056245 
* .E. < .OS 
** .E_< • 001 
*** .E. < .005 
**** .E. < .0005 
APPENDIXH 
NEWMAN-KEULS TESTS 
111 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
4 
1 
2 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN OVERALL DATA 
ANALYSIS (PERCEPTION CONDITION) 
4 1 2 3 
q_ 95 (r,66) r 
1.0045 1. 0143 1.0460 1.0784 
.0098 .0415 .0739* 3 3.74 
.0317 .0641* 2 3.40 
.0324 1 2.83 
a 
s- = d .01755 
* .E. < .05 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
2 
4 
3 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN OVERALL DATA 
ANALYSIS (IMAGERY CONDITION) 
2 4 1 3 
q_ 95 (r,66) r 
1.1518 1.1675 1.1729 1. 2384 
.0157 .0211 • 0866** 4 3.74 
.0054. .0709* 3 3.40 
.0655* 2 2.83 
a 
s- = d .01755 
**q. 99 (2,66) 4.59; sdq. 99 (2,66) 
* .E. < .05 
.0806; .E. < .01 
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sdq. 95 (r,66) a 
.0656 
.0597 
.0497 
saq.95(r,66) a 
.0656 
.0597 
.0497 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
1 
2 
3 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN FIRST HALF OF 
TRIALS (PERCEPTION CONDITION) 
4 1 2 3 
r q. 95 (r,66) 
1. 0435 1.0783 1.0900 1. 1467 
.0348 .0465 .1032* 4 3.74 
.0117 .0684 3 3.40 
.0567 2 2.83 
a 
s = d .02645 
* .E. < .05 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
4 
2 
1 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN FIRST HALF OF 
TRIALS (IMAGERY CONDITION) 
4 2 1 3 
1.2024 1.2242 1. 2270 1. 3299 / 
r.q. 99 (r,66) 
.0218 .0246 .1275** 4 4.59 
.0028 .1057* 3 4.28 
• 1029** 2 3.76 
a 
sci= .02645 
* q. 95 (2,66) = 3.40; sdq. 95 (2,66) = .0899; .E. < .05 
** .E. < • 01 
113 
sdq.95(r,66)a 
.0989 
.0899 
.0748 
sdq. 99 (r,66) a 
.1214 
.1132 
.0994 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
1 
4 
2 
. 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN SECOND HALF OF 
TRIALS (PERCEPTION CONDITION) 
1 4 2 3 
q_ 95 (r,66) r 
.9602 .9692 1.0123 1.0233 
.0090 .0521 .0631 4 3. 74 . 
.0431 .0541 3 3.40 
.0110 2 2.83 
a 
s = d .01914 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
2 
1 
4 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN SECOND HALF OF 
TRIALS (IMAGERY CONDITION) 
2 1 4 3 
q_ 95 (r,66) r 
1.0958 1.1288 1.1362 1. 1641 
.0330 .0404 .0683 4 3.74 
.0074 .0353 3 3.40 
.0279 2 2.83 
a 
s = d • 01914 
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sdq. 95 (r,66) 
a 
' 
.0716 
.0651 
.0542 
sdq. 95 (r,66) a 
.0716 
.0651 
.0542 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
4 
2 
1 • 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LET.TER POSITIONS IN OVERALL DATA 
ANALYSIS (LEFT VISUAL FIELD 
PRESENTATION) 
4 2 1 3 
q_ 99 (r,66) r 
1.0718 1. 0788 1.0982 1.1671 
' 
.0070 .0264 .0953** 4 4.59 
.0194 .0883** 3 4.28 
. 
.0689** 2 3.76 
a 
s- = d .01755 
** .E. < .01 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
1 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN OVERALL DATA 
ANALYSIS (RIGHT VISUAL FIELD 
PRESENTATION) 
4 1 2 3 
q_ 99 (r,66) r 
1. 0891 1.1002 1.1190 1.1497 
• 0111. .0299 .0606 4 4.59 
.0188 .0495 3 4.2"8 
.0307 2 3.76 
a 
s- = d .01755 
ll5 
sdq. 99 (r,66) a 
.0806 
.0751 
.0660 
sdq. 99 (r,66) a 
.0806 
.0751 
.0660 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
4 
2 
1 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN FIRST HALF OF 
TRIALS (LEFT VISUAL FIELD 
PRESENTATION) 
4 2 1 3 
q_ 99 (r,66) r 
1.1238 1.1268 1. 1634 1.2609 
.0030 .0396 • 1371** 4 4.59 
.0366 .1341** 3 4.28 
.0975* 2 3.76 
a 
sa = .02645 
* q. 95 (2,66) = 2,83; sdq. 95 (2,66) = .0748; .E. < .05 
**.E. < .01 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN FIRST HALF OF 
TRIALS (RIGHT VISUAL FIELD 
PRESENTATION) 
Letter 4 1 2 3 Position 
r q_ 95 (r,66) 
Means 1.1221 1.1419 1. 1874 1. 2156 
4 • 0198 .0653 .0935 4 3.74 
1 .0455 .0737 3 3.40 
2 .0282 2 2.83 
a . 
sd = .02645 
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saq.99(r,66) a 
.1214 
.1132 
.0994 
saq.95(r,66)a 
.0989 
.0899 
.0748 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
4 
1 
2 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN SECOND HALF OF 
TRIALS (LEFT VISUAL FIELD 
PRESENTATION) 
-
4 1 2 3 
q_ 95 (r,66) r 
1. 0263 1.0422 1. 0427 1.0900 
.0159 .0164 .0637 4 3.74 
.0005 .0478 3 3.40 
' 
.0473 2 2.83 
a 
s- = d .01914 
Letter 
Position 
Means 
1 
2 
4 
NEWMAN-KEULS TEST ON RESPONSE LATENCIES FOR 
LETTER POSITIONS IN SECOND HALF OF 
TRIALS (RIGHT VISUAL FIELD 
PRESENTATION) 
1 2 4 3 
r q_ 95 (r,66) 
1.0469 1.0654 1.0791 1.0974 
.0185 .0322 .0505 4 3.74 
.0137 .0320 3 3.40 
.0183 2 2.83 
a 
s- = d .01914 
117 
sdq. 95 (r,66) a 
.0716 
.0651 
.0542 
sdq. 95 (r,66) 
a 
.0716 
.0651 
.0542 
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